




THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY 
JOSHUA D. BLANK* 
ABSTRACT 
Fairness in the administration of the tax law is a subject of intense 
debate in the United States. As myriad headlines reveal, the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has been accused of failing to enforce the tax law 
equitably in its review of tax-exempt status applications by political 
organizations, international tax structures of multinational corporations, 
and estate tax returns of millionaires, among other areas. Many have 
argued that greater “tax transparency” would better empower the public 
to hold the IRS accountable and the IRS to defend itself against accusations 
of malfeasance. Mandatory public disclosure of taxpayers’ tax return 
information is often proposed as a way to achieve greater tax 
transparency. Yet, in addition to concerns regarding exposure of personal 
and proprietary information, broad public disclosure measures pose 
potential threats to the taxing authority’s ability to enforce the tax law. 
Given the competing values of accountability and enforcement, what 
tax return information should be observable by the public? This Article 
considers the role of timing. The IRS continually engages in enforcement 
actions ex post—after taxpayers pursue transactions and claim tax 
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also frequently engages in actions ex ante—before taxpayers pursue 
transactions and claim tax positions—by issuing advance tax rulings to, 
and entering into agreements with, specific taxpayers. While current law 
appears to require public disclosure of certain types of ex ante tax 
administration, many forms of ex ante tax administration remain concealed 
from public view. This Article argues that documents related to a specific 
taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should be 
publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that 
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve 
effective tax enforcement. Further, this Article proposes that the public 
should have access not only to ex ante tax administration actions where the 
taxing authority grants taxpayers’ requests, but also to those actions where 
the taxing authority denies such requests, even if it does so without issuing 
an official written determination, a concept it defines as “dual tax 
transparency.” 
The Article then applies this analysis to several types of ex ante tax 
administration that are currently obscured by the curtain of tax privacy: 
withdrawn private letter ruling requests, adverse tax-exempt determination 
letters, and advance pricing agreements. It concludes by exploring 
approaches to improving the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex post 
tax enforcement other than public disclosure of tax return information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fairness in the administration of the tax law is a subject of intense 
debate in the United States, as myriad headlines reveal. Recent 
investigations that exposed the low, or in some cases, nonexistent taxation 
of earnings achieved through international transfer pricing structures by 
brand-name corporations such as Google,1 Apple,2 General Electric,3 and 
Starbucks,4 among many others,5 have caused some critics to question why 
the IRS either has failed to challenge these structures more vigorously or 
has even offered them its blessings.6 Likewise, stories in the popular press 
suggesting that the IRS reduced its audits of federal estate tax returns of 
millionaires have generated concern that the agency has failed to enforce 
 
 1. See Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax Loopholes, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-
how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html. 
 2. See Memorandum from Carl Levin and John McCain, Senators, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, to Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (May 21, 2013) 
(regarding Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code in relation to Apple, Inc.). 
 3. See David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html. 
 4. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income 
Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515 (2013). 
 5. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even Tea Party 
Condemns, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010), https://thewere42.wordpress.com/2010/05/14/companies-
dodge-60-billion-in-taxes-even-tea-party-condemns. 
 6. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Dell’s Multiple Restructurings Aid It in Tax Avoidance, 138 
TAX NOTES 499 (2013); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 699, 708–09 
(2011) (criticizing 2006 Advance Pricing Agreement between IRS and Google). 
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the tax law against those with the greatest ability to pay.7 And irrespective 
of whether an ongoing inquiry into the IRS’s review of political 
organizations’ applications for tax-exempt status ultimately finds abuse of 
discretion or worse,8 critics have nonetheless questioned the impartiality of 
the agency.9 In response to these reports, many have argued that greater 
“tax transparency” would better empower both the public to hold the IRS 
accountable and the IRS to defend itself against accusations of 
malfeasance.10 
While often presented as a panacea for public discontent with the tax 
 
 7. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. to Cut Tax Auditors, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/business/23tax.html; Allen Kenney, IRS Plans Significant Cuts to 
Estate Tax Program, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 24, 2006), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-
today/estate-gift-and-inheritance-taxes/irs-plans-significant-cuts-estate-tax-program/2006/07/24/50467 
56? 
 8. See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO 
IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/ 
auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 738, TAXPROFBLOG (May 17, 2015), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2015/05/the-irs--1.html; Fred Stokeld, IRS Sparks Outrage 
with Admission It Mistreated Tea Party Groups, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/exempt-organizations/irs-sparks-outrage-admission-it-
mistreated-tea-party-groups/2013/05/13/f319?; Marc A. Thiessen, How Obama’s IRS Scandal Harms 
National Security, WASH. POST: OPINIONS (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
marc-thiessen-how-obamas-irs-scandal-harms-national-security/2013/08/05/9fea9616-fde1-11e2-96a8-
d3b921c0924a_story.html; Molly Wharton, Issa to IRS Commissioner: ‘You Have a Problem 
Maintaining Credibility,’ NAT’L. REV.: THE CORNER (June 24, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
corner/381078/issa-irs-commissioner-you-have-problem-maintaining-credibility-molly-wharton 
(quoting Rep. Darrell Issa). But see STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. 
ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., IRS AND TIGTA MANAGEMENT FAILURES 
RELATED TO 501(C)(4) APPLICANTS ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY (Comm. Print 2014) 
(concluding that IRS subjected both conservative and liberal groups to “delays, burdensome questions, 
and mismanagement”). For scholarly discussion of the controversy, see Ellen P. Aprill, The Section 527 
Obstacle to Effective Section 501(c)(4) Regulations, PITT. TAX REV. (forthcoming); George K. Yin, 
Reforming (And Saving) the IRS By Respecting the Public’s Right to Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 
1162–64 (2014). 
 10. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ariel Siman, The 1 Percent Solution: Corporate Tax 
Returns Should Be Public (and How to Get There), TAX NOTES INT’L, Feb. 17, 2014, at 627; Yariv 
Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 106 (2014); Allison Christians, Do We Need to Know 
More About Our Public Companies?, TAX NOTES INT’L, May 28, 2012, at 843; Lee A. Sheppard, 
Should Corporate Tax Returns Be Disclosed?, 142 TAX NOTES 1381 (2014); Joseph J. Thorndike, Show 
Us the Money, 123 TAX NOTES 148 (2009) [hereinafter Thorndike, Show Us the Money]; Joseph J. 
Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, 122 TAX NOTES 691 (2009) [hereinafter Thorndike, The 
Thorndike Challenge]; Yin, supra note 9, at 1162–64; Catherine Rampell, Shareholders, Public 
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system, tax transparency—which can be defined broadly as the 
government’s openness regarding its tax rules, agency interpretations, 
decisionmaking processes, and enforcement practices—serves two distinct 
purposes. Tax transparency is first and foremost an essential feature of 
democratic governance, providing the public with knowledge of the tax 
laws and policies, both as enacted and as applied, and facilitating informed 
debate.11 In addition, tax transparency empowers the public to monitor the 
taxing authority, the IRS, deterring the agency from pursuing misguided 
policies or engaging in malfeasance or corruption.12 
Mandatory public disclosure of taxpayers’ tax return information is 
often proposed as a way to achieve greater tax transparency. Today, nearly 
all tax returns are subject to extensive tax privacy protections that prohibit 
the federal government from publicly releasing any taxpayer’s “returns” or 
“return information.”13 In contrast, several scholars, including Joseph 
Thorndike,14 Marjorie Kornhauser,15 Marc Linder,16 and Laurence 
Kotlikoff,17 have advocated for public disclosure of some or all of 
individual taxpayers’ annual tax returns in order to ensure that the IRS is 
pursuing adequate investigations18 and is “free . . . from corrupting 
influences.”19 Similarly, scholars such as Reuven Avi-Yonah,20 Allison 
Christians,21 Richard Pomp,22 and John Braithwaite,23 among others,24 have 
 
 11. See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
14–15 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 885, 888–910 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1339, 1348–50. 
 12. See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. See also Fenster, supra note 11, at 888-910; 
Schauer, supra note 11, at 1348-50; Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 015: Transparency, 
LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (Mar. 6, 2016), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/. 
 13. I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b) (2016).  
 14. See generally Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10; Thorndike, The Thorndike 
Challenge, supra note 10 (arguing for public access to individuals’ tax returns). 
 15. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase 
Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 113 (2005). 
 16. See generally Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost for Millionaires: Peeking Behind the Veil of 
Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951 (1990–91). 
 17. See Anna Bernasek, Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business//yourtaxes/14disclose.html (quoting Professor Laurence 
Kotlikoff). See also Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1065, 1120–43 (2003); Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 895–96 
(2008). 
 18. See, e.g., Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
 19. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 98. 
 20. Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627. 
 21. Christians, supra note 10, at 843. 
 22. See generally Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: 
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proposed that publicly traded corporations in the United States be required 
to publicly disclose their annual tax returns in order to achieve “greater 
accountability not only regarding the taxes paid by multinationals, but also 
those demanded to be paid by governments.”25 Since the dawn of the 
federal income tax in the United States, legislators and others have offered 
similar proposals out of the concern that secrecy in tax administration gives 
rise to “favoritism,”26 “collusion,”27 and “corruption.”28 
Despite its potential to shine sunlight upon the taxing authority’s 
actions, broad public disclosure measures pose several potential threats to 
the taxing authority’s ability to enforce the tax law effectively.29 Without 
tax privacy, individual taxpayers would observe salient examples of the 
IRS’s tax enforcement weaknesses, which would likely result in shifts in 
individuals’ perceptions of the agency’s strengths in detecting tax offenses 
and punishing their perpetrators.30 Additionally, public disclosure of 
complete tax returns, as opposed to more targeted measures, would 
increase the ability of certain actors—shareholders, corporate managers, 
and even individual taxpayers—to establish benchmarks of aggressiveness 
in several tax compliance areas and pressure their agents, such as corporate 
tax directors or personal tax advisors, to pursue more aggressive strategies 
to keep pace with the tax planning of others.31 And public disclosure of 
certain tax return information would enhance the ability of advisors and 
 
Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373 (1993). 
 23. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 161 (2005). 
 24. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Can Publicity Curb Corporate Tax Avoidance?, FIN. TIMES: THE A-
LIST (Jan. 31, 2013), http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/01/31/can-publicity-curb-corporate-tax-
avoidance; Editorial Bd., On Corporate Taxes, Put the Public in Publicly Traded: View, BLOOMBERG: 
BLOOMBERGVIEW (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2011-10-06/on-corporate-
taxes-put-the-public-in-publicly-traded-view; Felix Salmon, Why Public Companies Should Have 
Public Tax Returns, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/05/21/why-
public-companies-should-have-public-tax-returns/. 
 25. Christians, supra note 10, at 843. 
 26. S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 12 (1924) (criticizing secrecy of tax appeals decisions). 
 27. HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM 1861 
TO 1871, at 67 (1914). 
 28. Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Sen. Robert Howell). 
 29. Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265, 292 (2011) 
[hereinafter Blank, Individual Tax Privacy]; Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 
11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 72–73 (2014) [hereinafter Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy]; Joshua D. Blank, 
USA, in TAX SECRECY AND TAX TRANSPARENCY: THE RELEVANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN TAX LAW 
1163, 1177 (Eleonor Kristoffersson et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Blank, USA]. 
 30. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 287–26. 
 31. See Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 62–69. 
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other third parties to reverse engineer the IRS’s detection strategies, 
impairing its deterrence and enforcement efforts.32 
Given the competing values of accountability and enforcement, what 
types of tax return information should be observable by the public? This 
Article considers the role of timing. The IRS continually engages in 
enforcement actions ex post—after taxpayers pursue transactions and claim 
tax positions—such as by conducting audits or negotiating settlements.33 
But it also frequently engages in actions ex ante—before taxpayers pursue 
transactions and claim tax positions—by issuing advance tax rulings to and 
entering advance agreements with specific taxpayers.34 While current law 
appears to require public disclosure of certain types of ex ante tax 
administration, many forms of ex ante tax administration remain concealed 
from public view. This Article argues that documents related to a specific 
taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should be 
publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that 
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve 
effective tax enforcement. Further, this Article proposes that the public 
should have access not only to ex ante tax administration actions where the 
taxing authority grants taxpayers’ requests, but also to those actions where 
the taxing authority denies such requests, even if it does so without issuing 
an official written determination, a concept it defines as “dual tax 
transparency.” 
Ex ante tax administration, which largely occurs in the form of 
advance tax rulings issued by the taxing authority, should be publicly 
accessible for three reasons. 
First, non-disclosure of ex ante tax administration presents greater 
risks to the sociological legitimacy of the IRS—the public’s perception of 
the actions of the IRS as justified and appropriate—than non-disclosure of 
ex post tax enforcement.35 Without access to advance tax rulings, the risk 
of public perceptions that the IRS creates secret tax law when issuing 
advance tax rulings increases. As a result of its greater bargaining power 
when considering requests for advance tax rulings, the IRS often has more 
freedom to express its own interpretation of the tax law in this setting.36 
 
 32. See id. at 69–73. 
 33. See infra notes 136–148 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 149–157 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 36. See infra notes 218–229 and accompanying text. 
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These rulings reflect the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law, whereas ex 
post tax enforcement decisions often involve other factors, such as the 
administrative costs of pursuing litigation. Moreover, taxpayers have an 
interest in determining whether the IRS is issuing advance tax rulings on 
equitable terms to like-situated taxpayers. And given the enormous 
financial stakes involved, often billions of dollars in potential tax liability,37 
and the IRS’s ex ante bargaining position, advance tax rulings pose unique 
threats to the integrity of the IRS, whether perceived or actual. 
Second, public disclosure of ex ante tax administration can promote 
efficient financial transactions, whereas public disclosure of ex post tax 
enforcement is more likely to result in wasteful aggressive tax planning.38 
Public disclosure of these rulings would provide taxpayers with greater 
understanding of the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law, potentially 
preventing transactions or other actions designed to avoid the risk of audit 
or challenge. Public disclosure of advance tax rulings can also promote 
efficiency by guiding taxpayers regarding whether they should seek such 
rulings from the IRS themselves. By contrast, public disclosure of tax 
return information can encourage increased tax aggressiveness by enabling 
taxpayers and third parties to conduct reviews of the IRS’s ex post audit, 
settlement, and penalty techniques. 
Finally, compared to public disclosure of ex post tax administration, 
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration does not threaten the IRS’s 
ability to enforce the tax law.39 There is little risk that public disclosure of 
ex ante tax administration would adversely affect individual taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the government’s tax enforcement strengths, as the IRS 
retains discretion to issue advance tax rulings.40 It is also unlikely that 
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration would result in the 
development of benchmarks of tax aggressiveness, which could result from 
public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement. Last, public disclosure of ex 
ante tax administration would offer taxpayers guidance regarding the 
factors the IRS views as necessary in order to issue advance tax rulings, but 
 
 37. See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, The New Limits on Corporate Letter Rulings Explained, 134 TAX 
NOTES 622 (2012); Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, IRS Settle Transfer Pricing Dispute for $3.4 Billion, TAX 
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.taxnotes.com/news-documents/transfer-pricing-and-
apportionment-issues/glaxo-us-irs-settle-transfer-pricing-dispute-us-34-billion/2006/09/12/jmsy?. 
 38. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 39. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 40. See infra notes 256–264 and accompanying text. 
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it would not enable taxpayers to reverse engineer the agency’s approaches 
to detecting abusive tax positions. 
Even though the IRS is required to publicly disclose “written 
determination[s]”41 issued in response to taxpayers’ requests for advance 
tax rulings, agreements, and approvals, current law prevents the public 
from observing many forms of ex ante tax administration.42 When the IRS 
publishes advance tax rulings today, it almost always discloses rulings 
where the agency granted taxpayers’ requests.43 If they anticipate adverse 
rulings, taxpayers can withdraw their ruling requests, obviating the need for 
a written determination by the IRS.44 And certain types of ex ante tax 
administration are not publicly accessible in any form.45 As a baseline for 
public disclosure, “dual tax transparency” would enable the public to 
observe specific instances where the IRS grants and denies taxpayers’ 
requests for advance tax rulings or agreements. This Article applies this 
analysis to several types of ex ante tax administration that are currently 
obscured by the curtain of tax privacy: withdrawn private letter ruling 
requests, adverse tax-exempt determination letters, and Advance Pricing 
Agreements.46 
While this Article advocates for public disclosure of ex ante tax 
administration, it does not suggest that the IRS should be unaccountable 
when it pursues ex post tax enforcement. Rather than proposing mandatory 
tax return public disclosure, the Article explores several alternative 
approaches to improving the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex post 
tax enforcement.47 These possibilities include changes to oversight, 
whistleblower, and data access rules and processes. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents tax 
transparency as a way for the public to hold the taxing authority 
accountable for its actions, considers recent calls for public disclosure of 
tax return information as a means of accountability, and outlines several of 
the questionable assumptions underlying these proposals. Part II argues that 
the timing of the taxing authority’s actions should play a role in the 
determination of whether tax return information is publicly accessible, 
 
 41. I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016). 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. See infra notes 318–319 and accompanying text. 
 44. See infra notes 320–334 and accompanying text. 
 45. See infra notes 372–407 and accompanying text. 
 46. See infra Part III.B. 
 47. See infra Part III.C. 
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offers the case against public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement and for 
public disclosure of ex ante tax administration, and considers the cross-
jurisdictional application of this analysis, using Sweden as a comparative 
example. Part III introduces dual tax transparency, applies it to several 
examples of ex ante tax administration, and offers approaches for 
preserving accountability regarding ex post tax enforcement. The final Part 
concludes. 
I.  TAX TRANSPARENCY AS ACCOUNTABILITY 
Transparency is frequently extolled as an essential element of 
democracy.48 Without it, philosophers and legal scholars caution, the 
governed would possess little opportunity to hold the government 
accountable for its decisions and actions.49 In the context of tax 
administration, scholars, politicians, and popular commentators in the 
United States have long argued that the taxing authority, the IRS, should 
strive to conduct its affairs as transparently as possible.50 This Part presents 
the rationale for transparency by the government, including in the 
administration of the tax system, describes calls for public disclosure of 
individual and business tax return information as a form of tax 
transparency, and highlights several questionable assumptions underlying 
arguments of public disclosure proponents. 
A.  WHY TRANSPARENCY? 
While there is no universal definition of transparency in democratic 
governance, philosophers and legal scholars have often described it as 
“publicness of [the] public business,”51 where the government makes the 
information it holds “available for examination and scrutiny.”52 Likewise, 
tax scholars who advocate increased transparency in tax administration 
describe the need for “openness,”53 “accountability,”54 and “sunshine.”55 A 
 
 48. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 11, at 1348–50; Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental 
to Democracy 11 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 14-13, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2410812. 
 49. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 185, 186 (2014). 
 50. See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text. 
 51. Waldron, supra note 48, at 11. 
 52. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1343. 
 53. Yin, supra note 9, at 1161 n.196. 
 54. Christians, supra note 10, at 843. 
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broad definition of “tax transparency,” accordingly, is that it is the 
government’s openness regarding its tax rules, agency interpretations, 
decisionmaking processes, and enforcement practices. Transparency 
generally serves two functions, which apply equally in the context of tax 
administration: democratic governance and accountability. 
Democratic Governance. Transparency is often described as 
fundamental to democracy itself because the public’s knowledge of the 
government’s policies and practices establishes that the people possess 
power over the government.56 As Fred Schauer has stated, transparency 
permits “public control not for the purpose of facilitating better decisions, 
but instead as the embodiment of public control as an end in itself.”57 With 
this control, members of the public can participate in debate and 
deliberation regarding the government’s rules and actions based on actual 
knowledge rather than speculation. Legal philosophers have characterized a 
government that acts transparently as allowing its citizens “to meaningfully 
participate in democratic self-government”58 by encouraging the 
development of an “interested”59 rather than “suspicious”60 public. 
Transparency, thus, is a core democratic value because it establishes the 
people’s position with respect to the government and allows the people to 
engage in informed debate that may affect the government’s laws and 
implementation of these laws. 
Accountability. An equally important function of transparency is that 
it allows the public “to monitor government activity and hold officials, 
particularly incompetent and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions.”61 
This characterization of transparency predicts that without secrecy, the 
government will be less likely to engage in bribery, rent-seeking, 
regulatory capture, and “other forms of governmental misbehavior.”62 Even 
when the government adopts policies that may not be readily visible to the 
public, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant,63 and later John Rawls,64 
 
 55. Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627. 
 56. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 11, at 888; Schauer, supra note 11, at 1347; Waldron, supra 
note 48, at 11; Solum, supra note 12. 
 57. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1349. 
 58. Solum, supra note 12. 
 59. Fenster, supra note 11, at 898. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. at 899. 
 62. Schauer, supra note 11, at 1349. 
 63. IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE (1795), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 430, 470 
(Carl J. Friedrich ed. & trans., 1949). 
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have added that it should assume hypothetical transparency by pursuing 
only those policies that it could defend if they were ever exposed publicly. 
Transparency, consequently, is necessary for the public to ensure 
accountability of the government for its decisions and actions. 
Principal-Agent Relationship. In considering the role of transparency 
in democratic states, philosopher Jeremy Waldron has recently advocated 
for the adoption of what he describes as “agent-accountability,” which casts 
the government as an agent of the public, its principal.65 The concept of 
accountability under this model describes duties that the agent generally 
owes to its principal. As an example, Waldron describes a realtor and a 
client as engaged in an analogous relationship to the government and the 
public, as the realtor “makes certain arrangements for the purchase of a 
house on [his client’s] behalf”66 and “may even have a power of attorney to 
act in [his client’s] name.”67 Agent accountability casts the government as 
accountable to the public rather than to a formal tribunal, which may not 
investigate many of the government’s actions. 
The primary implication of the agent accountability model is that the 
government should provide information demanded by the public regarding 
activities conducted on its behalf. The model requires the government to 
provide sufficient information to the public in order to allow it to question 
the government’s methodology, request changes to its practices, and even 
terminate the service of legislators and regulators through elections.68 
Describing the requirement of disclosure, Waldron contends that if the 
government refuses to meet the public’s demand for an account regarding 
its activities, the government’s refusal is “simple insolence.”69 
Limits. Despite the view that transparency is crucial for accountability, 
many philosophers and legal theorists believe that disclosure policies 
should seek to limit adverse impact on the government’s ability to fulfill its 
obligations.70 Some have argued that disclosure requirements should seek 
 
 64. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 66 (1993). 
 65. Waldron, supra note 48, at 2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 27. 
 70. See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 811, 884 (2007); Schauer, supra note 11, at 1345 (discussing need “to recognize varying degrees 
of transparency”); William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2006, at 12. 
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to balance the benefits to the public against the costs to the government’s 
operational decisions.71 For example, few would argue that the government 
should be required to provide the public with a description of a planned 
surprise raid of a terrorist compound in advance of the enforcement action. 
In such cases, proponents of transparency argue that the government should 
provide the public with a concrete explanation for its decision to withhold 
information.72 Others, such as William Stuntz, have argued that the 
government would operate more efficiently if it were required to provide 
the public with “bottom lines”73 regarding its activities, as opposed to 
detailed accounts. Debates over the optimal level of transparency by the 
government reveal that there are circumstances where even public 
disclosure proponents do not believe the government should be required to 
release information to the public. 
B.  TAX RETURNS IN THE PUBLIC EYE 
Tax scholars, politicians, and popular commentators have argued that 
mandatory public disclosure of tax return information would introduce 
needed tax transparency in the United States, especially in light of recurrent 
concerns regarding fair treatment of taxpayers by both the taxing authority 
and the tax law itself. This Section examines current U.S. tax privacy rules 
and recent public disclosure proposals regarding individual and corporate 
tax return information. 
Tax Privacy Today. Since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976,74 which responded to many abuses of the Nixon Administration, the 
tax law provides that taxpayers’ “returns” and “return information” are 
confidential, unless a specific statutory exception applies.75 Under Section 
6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, “return information” is broadly defined 
to include “any tax or information return”; any amendments filed with the 
IRS; and any taxpayer’s identity, income, tax deductions and credits, or 
audit and penalty history, among many other items.76 The statutory 
framework contains several exceptions related to tax administration and 
enforcement, such as provisions that allow sharing of information about 
 
 71. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 11, at 936–37. 
 72. See Waldron, supra note 48, at 7. 
 73. Stuntz, supra note 70, at 15. 
 74. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. 
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particular taxpayer under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2016). 
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specific taxpayers between federal and state taxing authorities.77 These 
exceptions aside, the sweeping protections of tax privacy under current law 
prevent the public from observing nearly all tax return information and 
extend equally to individuals and corporations.78 
Public Disclosure of Individual Tax Returns. In contrast to the opacity 
of current law, tax scholars and others have proposed, in varying degrees, 
to lift the curtain of tax privacy that obscures individual tax returns from 
public view. Some scholars, such as Joseph Thorndike79 and Laurence 
Kotlikoff,80 and popular commentators81 have argued that individuals’ tax 
returns should be fully accessible by the public. Others, such as Marjorie 
Kornhauser, have suggested that only a portion of individual tax return 
information should be publicly accessible, such as an individual’s name, 
income, capital gains, exclusions, deductions and credits, and marginal and 
effective tax rates.82 Finally, some have proposed targeted mandatory 
public disclosure of individual tax returns that would apply to certain types 
of taxpayers, such as individuals who earn more than $1 million per year,83 
members of Congress,84 and candidates for certain public offices.85 
Opponents have argued that mandatory public disclosure would infringe 
upon taxpayers’ right to tax privacy, confuse the public with information 
overload rather than enhanced understanding, and expose sensitive personal 
information.86 In response, proponents contend that sunlight would aid the 
IRS in its search for abusive tax positions,87 subject aggressive and 
noncompliant taxpayers to public shaming,88 and educate the public 
regarding the tax law.89 
 
 77. I.R.C. §§ 6103(c)–(o) (2016). 
 78. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2016).  
 79. Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
 80. See Bernasek, supra note 17 (quoting Professor Laurence Kotlikoff). 
 81. See, e.g., Andy Rooney, 60 Minutes: Andy’s Tip for the IRS (CBS television broadcast Apr. 
19, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4955238n. 
 82. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 115–16. 
 83. Linder, supra note 16, at 976–77. 
 84. See, e.g., Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10, at 691. 
 85. See id.  
 86. For a summary of these arguments, see Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 280–
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 87. See, e.g., Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
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Significantly, proponents also argue that, if adopted, these measures 
would enable the public to better hold the IRS accountable and even seek 
reforms that would improve its ability to administer the tax law fairly. 
Joseph Thorndike, for example, has asserted that public disclosure would 
“reveal[] the actual, rather than the theoretical, functioning of the tax 
system”90 and would allow the public to effectively double-check the work 
of the IRS because it would cast “[m]illions of eyes on a tax return.”91 
Thorndike has argued that current tax privacy rules “make the IRS 
politically vulnerable, contributing to its popular image as an overpowerful, 
unaccountable federal agency.”92 Likewise, Marjorie Kornhauser has 
commented that public disclosure would show whether the administration 
of the tax system is “free from the corrupting influences of powerful, 
wealthy, and/or just simply venal individuals or groups.”93 And some 
scholars, such as Laurence Kotlikoff, have argued that by revealing “how 
terrible the system is,”94 mandatory public disclosure could lead to tax 
administration reforms. A common theme throughout these recent 
proposals is that public disclosure of individual tax return information 
would embolden the ability of the public to monitor the actions of the IRS, 
or lack thereof, against specific individual taxpayers. 
Similar accountability objectives underscore many of the individual 
tax return public disclosure measures that have been adopted since the 
dawn of the federal income tax in the United States. For example, soon 
after enacting the Civil War Income Tax of 1862, Congress required the 
Commissioner to permit public inspection of complete tax returns and the 
“proceedings of the assessors.”95 Journalists at The New York Times 
systematically analyzed the enforcement efforts of specific collection 
districts. For instance, in criticizing the underperforming “Sixth Collection 
District” in New York City in 1865, the paper’s reporters accused the 
office’s chief tax collector of lacking “brain with which to comprehend the 
mysteries of the law and physique with which to drive work and workmen 
to secure results.”96 When Congress later enacted legislation that required 
 
 90. Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
 91. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, supra note 10, at 691.  
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 93. Kornhauser, supra note 15, at 98. 
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 95. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228. 
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public disclosure of all individuals’ income tax payments, proponents 
argued that the legislation would prevent tax privacy from serving as “the 
greatest aid to corruption”97 between taxpayers and the IRS. Likewise, in 
1934, when Congress passed legislation that would have required all 
individuals to publicly disclose certain tax information on an annual “pink 
slip,” proponents asserted that it would enable the public to monitor 
whether the IRS offered “special privileges”98 and “gross favoritism”99 to 
wealthy taxpayers. 
Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns. Similarly, a number of 
tax scholars and policymakers have argued that publicly traded U.S. 
corporations should be required to publicly disclose certain tax return 
information, especially in light of accounts that brand-name U.S. 
multinational corporations have reported single-digit tax rates,100 
participated in abusive tax shelters,101 and pursued complex international 
transfer pricing structures that reduce or even eliminate tax liability.102 The 
most common proposal, offered by tax scholars such as Reuven Avi-
Yonah,103 Richard Pomp,104 John Braithwaite,105 Joseph Thorndike,106 
Allison Christians,107 and others,108 would require corporations to publish 
their complete tax returns each year. Complete corporate tax returns of a 
multinational corporation include IRS Form 1120, an annual return setting 
forth a multinational corporation’s gross income, deductions, taxable 
income, and taxes owed, but also dozens of attached forms, schedules, and 
explanatory documents that may, in total, amount to tens of thousands of 
pages.109 Proponents of public disclosure of corporate tax return 
 
 97. MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–
1939, at 67 (1984). 
 98. 78 CONG. REC. 6529, 6546 (1934) (statement of Sen. La Follette). 
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 107. See Christians, supra note 10, at 843. 
 108. See Brauner, supra note 10, at 106; Rampell, supra note 10; Sheppard, supra note 10. 
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information argue that it would lead to public scrutiny of the IRS’s dealings 
with corporations.110 Other tax scholars have argued in favor of more 
limited public disclosure of corporate tax return information.111 In prior 
work, for example, I have advocated for mandatory public disclosure of 
public corporations’ single-page IRS Form 1120 (without any attachments), 
IRS Schedule M-3, and a corporate “pink slip” (which would contain only 
certain tax information).112 
The public monitoring goals underlying recent public disclosure 
proposals are nearly identical to the stated rationales for historic measures 
that required corporations to publicly disclose their tax returns. When 
Congress first enacted the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, it provided that 
corporate tax returns “shall constitute public records and be open to 
inspection as such.”113 While mandatory corporate tax return public 
disclosure was short-lived, one of its goals was to “encourage honesty”114 
by both corporations and the tax administration. Similarly, during the 1934 
debates over the pink slip measure, which would have required 
corporations to publicly disclose certain tax return information, advocates 
argued that the measure would prevent “maladministration of the tax 
law.”115 
C.  QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS 
Proponents of broad tax transparency measures, such as mandatory 
public disclosure of complete tax return information,116 have asserted that 
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their proposals would enhance the ability of the public to hold the IRS 
accountable for its actions and, if necessary, seek reforms that would result 
in more equitable and effective tax administration. The claim that such 
public disclosure would lead to accountability and reformed tax 
administration, however, rests on several questionable assumptions. 
First, proponents of broad public disclosure of tax return information 
discount the potential for legislators and others to exploit specific examples 
of IRS shortcomings for political purposes, rather than to engage in 
objective review of tax administration. Public disclosure of complete tax 
return information would enable interested parties, including members of 
Congress, to highlight specific tax enforcement examples as signs of IRS 
abuse even though they are not representative of general IRS practices. For 
example, during the 1998 U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearings that 
reviewed the IRS’s enforcement operations,117 committee members and the 
public heard over a dozen “horror stories”118 from sympathetic taxpayers 
who claimed abusive treatment by the IRS, including a pastor,119 single 
mother,120 and even a former U.S. Senator.121 Subsequent investigations 
revealed that several of these accounts were greatly exaggerated and not 
indicative of general malfeasance.122 Public disclosure of all tax return 
information could lead politicians to seize on any IRS enforcement action 
against politically involved taxpayers, whether members of Congress or 
corporations that have made political contributions, as an example of 
enforcement bias.123 
Second, some proponents of public disclosure assume that releasing 
tax return information could motivate Congress to respond to revealed 
enforcement failures by seeking reforms that would bolster the IRS’s 
enforcement capabilities. For instance, Congress could respond to the 
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revelation that the IRS has failed to audit certain wealthy individuals or 
corporations by increasing its enforcement funding. If past experience is 
any guide, however, the revelation that the IRS has failed to enforce the 
law effectively is just as likely, if not more likely, to result in a blunt 
response of reduced budgetary resources.124 For example, in response to a 
2015 report that the IRS website allowed computer hackers to gain access 
to 100,000 taxpayers’ tax returns and use this information to request 
fraudulent refunds,125 members of Congress responded by proposing 
legislation that would impose what critics described as “draconian” cuts to 
the IRS’s operating needs, including those related to its cybersecurity 
efforts.126 Likewise, following publicity of allegations of political bias by 
the IRS in the tax-exempt application review process,127 members of 
Congress voted to reduce the IRS’s overall budget as a response to the 
IRS’s “recent history of inappropriate behavior.”128 Even if public 
disclosure of tax return information leads to an increased public focus on 
the IRS, the result would likely be reduced enforcement resources rather 
than targeted reform. 
Third, proponents assume that mandatory public disclosure would 
enable the public to double-check the IRS’s detection of tax avoidance and 
evasion, especially involving wealthy taxpayers and corporations, and to 
offer recommendations regarding its audit practices. For instance, Joseph 
Thorndike has argued that with public access to tax return information, 
external institutions and parties, including “plenty of expert ones,” would 
“certainly uncover any problems in short order.”129 While the IRS may 
make a deliberate decision not to pursue certain known cases of tax 
avoidance as a result of resource constraints or the hazards of litigation, in 
many cases of unknown tax avoidance, the most valuable information to 
the IRS rests with the taxpayer and closely-related parties. For this reason, 
the IRS pays valuable rewards to informants and whistleblowers who 
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provide it with leads on potential individual and corporate avoidance.130 It 
is more likely that exposure of otherwise unknown tax avoidance or 
evasion would result from the actions of a financially incentivized 
whistleblower, who already has access to information that the IRS cannot 
observe, than from a public review of tax return documents already in the 
possession of the IRS. Non-governmental parties would also lack the legal 
authority to request needed information from a taxpayer to determine 
whether the IRS has adequately investigated its claimed tax positions.131 
Finally, proponents of broad public disclosure appear to assume that it 
would result in IRS accountability without imposing significant costs on 
the capacity of the IRS to enforce the tax law effectively. Many proponents 
of public disclosure acknowledge that the release of tax return information 
could impose costs on taxpayers that should be considered. For example, 
several proponents concede that in a public disclosure regime, Social 
Security numbers and other sensitive personal information should be 
redacted from tax returns before release.132 Yet in terms of the effect on the 
IRS, some proponents claim that public disclosure would “not cost the IRS 
a nickel.”133 This assumption will be challenged in the next Part. 
II.  TIMING AND THE TAXING AUTHORITY 
While proponents of mandatory public disclosure of tax return 
information argue that this approach would empower the public to better 
monitor the actions of the IRS, they have not addressed the possibility that 
opening tax returns to “millions of eyes”134 could also present costs to tax 
administration and enforcement. Some tax return public disclosure 
measures would likely hamper the IRS’s efforts to suppress and detect tax 
avoidance and evasion, causing the principal to interfere with the agent’s 
capacity to satisfy one if its core responsibilities.135 From an accountability 
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perspective, policymakers should consider potential threats to tax 
administration and enforcement in their analysis of proposed public 
disclosure initiatives. 
As this Part will argue, threats to tax enforcement vary depending on 
the type of tax return documentation that would be subject to mandatory 
public disclosure. The most significant threats would likely occur where 
taxpayers and advisors could observe the tax avoidance strategies of other 
taxpayers and the factors that lead the IRS to audit and challenge some of 
these strategies. These types of observations would be possible if taxpayers 
and advisors could observe the IRS’s enforcement actions that occur ex 
post, after taxpayers have pursued transactions and claimed tax positions, 
such as the results of audits (or lack thereof) and settlement negotiations. 
On the other hand, these threats would be less likely to occur, if at all, if 
taxpayers and advisors could observe the advance tax rulings and 
agreements that the IRS often provides to taxpayers. These types of actions 
occur ex ante, before taxpayers pursue transactions and claim tax positions. 
The primary claim presented in this Part is that documents related to a 
specific taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should 
be publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that 
reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve 
effective tax enforcement. This Part details the potential threats to tax 
enforcement of public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement and presents 
the case for public disclosure of tax return documentation that would reveal 
ex ante tax administration. It concludes by considering the potential for 
cross-jurisdictional application of this analysis, using the tax transparency 
regime of Sweden as a case study. 
A.  TYPES OF TAXING AUTHORITY ACTIONS 
While proponents of tax transparency seek to hold the IRS 
accountable for its actions, not all of these actions are of the same stripe. 
This Section considers the timing of the IRS’s actions with respect to 
specific taxpayers, whether it occurs ex post or ex ante, and briefly 
describes the extent to which the public can observe each type of action 
under current law. 
1.  Ex Post Tax Enforcement 
The IRS’s ex post tax enforcement actions range from initial audits 
and investigations that transpire within the administrative structures of the 
IRS to controversies regarding potential tax deficiencies that take place in 
federal court. 
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Audits and Investigations. Formal IRS audits, which occur after a 
taxpayer has filed its tax return, take several forms: “correspondence 
audits,” which occur entirely in the form of IRS inquiries and requests for 
information by mail; “office audits,” which require a taxpayer to appear in 
the local IRS office with copies of any requested additional information; 
and “field audits,” which take place at the taxpayer’s home or place of 
business as a result of the location of relevant books and records.136 Several 
factors determine whether the IRS chooses to pursue a formal audit, 
including “red flags” such as inconsistent reporting of information by third 
parties and the taxpayer, a high Discriminant Function System (“DIF”) 
score—computer scoring that identifies whether the return is likely to result 
in a change based on the IRS’s experience with similar tax returns, and 
randomness due to the IRS’s need to gather data to construct the DIF score 
and for use in other research programs.137 For individual taxpayers, the 
formal audit rate is extraordinarily low—0.86% in 2014.138 By contrast, 
certain large corporations that participate in the IRS’s “Coordinated 
Industry Case” program are under constant IRS audit, in some cases with 
IRS agents permanently working in their offices.139 
Tax Penalties. Following the review of a taxpayer’s tax return during 
an audit, the IRS may assert that the taxpayer owes additional tax penalties. 
Most of these penalties consist of monetary sanctions equal to a percentage 
of the taxpayer’s underpayment of tax liability, such as delinquency 
penalties (up to 25% of tax liability for failure to pay taxes on time)140 or 
accuracy penalties (up to 20% of tax liability for understatement of tax due 
to acts such as negligence).141 
Settlements. A critical ex post tax enforcement tool of the IRS is its 
ability to enter into settlement agreements with taxpayers. At the earliest 
stage of a potential tax controversy, a taxpayer may pay an asserted tax 
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deficiency and enter into a settlement agreement with the IRS.142 
Taxpayers who choose to challenge a proposed deficiency may later settle 
the dispute with the IRS Appeals Division, in which each party signs an 
agreement that waives the ability of the taxpayer and the IRS to engage in 
future litigation over the issue.143 Other forms of ex post IRS settlements 
include “closing agreements,” where the IRS and the taxpayer enter into a 
legally binding written agreement to resolve tax liability regarding a 
specific issue or year “permanently and conclusively,”144 and “voluntary 
disclosure initiatives,” where taxpayers disclose past tax abuses, such as the 
use of offshore bank accounts to avoid federal tax liability, in exchange for 
reduced tax penalties.145 The IRS settles over 85% of all disputes regarding 
proposed tax deficiencies.146 
Observability. Current law characterizes nearly all of the documents 
that would reveal ex post tax enforcement actions as “return information” 
that is protected by the curtain of tax privacy.147 Litigation over contested 
tax deficiencies, however, occurs in full view of the public. Additionally, 
the curtain of tax privacy does not apply to anonymous statistical 
information regarding tax enforcement.148 
2.  Ex Ante Tax Administration 
In contrast to the examples above, sometimes the IRS acts ex ante, 
before the taxpayer has pursued a transaction or tax strategy and filed its 
tax return, in the form of rulings, agreements, and approvals that the IRS 
issues to specific taxpayers. 
Rulings. If a taxpayer requests it to do so, the IRS can issue an 
advance tax ruling to the taxpayer regarding specific issues before the 
taxpayer files its tax return. The most common form of advance tax ruling 
is the “private letter ruling,” a written determination issued by the IRS to a 
 
 142. See IRS Form 870. 
 143. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 8.6.4 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/irm_08-
006-004.html; IRS Form 870-AD.  
 144. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.3.4.3 (2004), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-
003-004.html. 
 145. See, e.g., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-
offshore-voluntary-disclosure-program (last updated Feb. 13, 2017).  
 146. See, e.g., B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Resolving Tax 
Shelters: By Settlement or Litigation, Address Before the Chicago Bar Association Federal Taxation 
Committee (Feb. 25, 2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/shelters-feb25.pdf. 
 147. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2016). 
 148. See id. (excluding data which cannot be associated with or identify an individual taxpayer). 
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taxpayer in response to the taxpayer’s inquiry about the status or the tax 
effects of the taxpayer’s actions or transactions.149 In a private letter ruling, 
the IRS interprets the tax laws and applies them to the taxpayer’s specific 
set of facts.150 In exchange for the ruling, the taxpayer must make 
numerous representations,151 provide information to the IRS in response to 
additional inquiries, and pay the required user fee ($28,300 for many types 
of common private letter ruling requests).152 
Agreements. The IRS can also enter into agreements with the taxpayer 
in advance of the taxpayer’s participation in transactions, and these 
agreements may address a period of years. A common type of ex ante 
agreement is the Advance Pricing Agreement, which a corporation may 
seek in order to avoid future transfer pricing disputes with the IRS.153 
Approvals. The IRS can also prevent taxpayers from engaging in 
certain activities unless it issues ex ante approval to these taxpayers. A 
common example of such an approval is the tax-exempt determination 
letter, which the IRS issues to an organization that seeks to be recognized 
as a charitable organization described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.154 Other examples of actions that require ex ante approvals 
occur when the IRS must provide administrative relief, authorized by 
Sections 301.9100-1 through -3 of the Treasury regulations, in order to 
allow taxpayers to make certain tax elections—such as an election to be 
recognized as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes—where the deadline for 
making these elections has expired.155 
Observability. Current law requires the IRS to open to public 
inspection “written determinations,” defined as any “ruling, determination 
letter, technical advice memorandum, or Chief Counsel advice,”156 
including private letter rulings. As Part III will show, however, many forms 
of ex ante tax administration are hidden from public view.157 
 
 149. See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 7 (defining letter ruling). 
 150. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19 C.B. 8. 
 152. See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 79 (detailing the Schedule of User Fees). 
 153. For description, see I.R.S. Announcement 2012-13, 2012-16 I.R.B. 805. 
 154. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 4220, APPLYING FOR 501(C)(3) TAX-
EXEMPT STATUS 10 (2014).  
 155. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1–3 (1997).  
 156. I.R.C. § 6110(b)(1)(A) (2016). 
 157. See infra Part III.B.  
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B.  WHY EX POST TAX ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REMAIN PRIVATE 
Broad public disclosure measures, such as those that would require 
disclosure of complete tax returns, would reveal otherwise unobservable ex 
post tax enforcement actions of the IRS. Complete tax returns contain 
many forms and documents that show whether the IRS audited a taxpayer’s 
return, entered into a settlement agreement with the taxpayer, or asserted 
tax penalties against the taxpayer as a result of a specific offense, among 
other actions of the IRS. For example, if the IRS audits an individual’s tax 
return and ultimately enters into a settlement with the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer’s return information may include IRS Form 870 (Waiver of 
Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and 
Acceptance of Overassessment),158 IRS Form 5701 (Notice of Proposed 
Adjustment),159 or IRS Form 4549-E (Income Tax Discrepancy 
Adjustments),160 each of which describe elements of the settlement and 
explain required changes to previously filed tax returns. 
To consider the extent to which public disclosure of tax return 
information would reveal ex post enforcement actions of the IRS, this 
Section presents a hypothetical alternative legal regime in which complete 
tax returns of individual and corporate taxpayers would be subject to 
mandatory public disclosure. Several advocates of tax transparency have 
argued, knowingly or not, in favor of such expansive mandatory public 
disclosure.161 And at different points in U.S. tax history, the complete tax 
returns of certain taxpayers were indeed open to public inspection.162 
As I argue, broad public disclosure of ex post enforcement actions of 
the IRS poses significant threats to the IRS’s ability to enforce the tax law 
effectively. This Section presents three potential tax administration and 
enforcement threats to the IRS from mandatory public disclosure of 
complete tax return information: impairment of strategic publicity; 
benchmarking; and reverse engineering.163 
 
 158. IRS Form 870. 
 159. IRS Form 5701. 
 160. IRS Form 4549-E. 
 161. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627; Bartlett, supra note 116; Rampell, 
supra note 10; Salmon, supra note 24; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
 162. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (requiring public disclosure of 
corporate tax returns); Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 19, 13 Stat. 223, 228 (requiring public 
disclosure of “proceeding of the assessors”). 
 163. In presenting this analysis, I build upon my prior work on tax privacy and public disclosure 
initiatives, Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29; Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, 
in two significant ways. First, I show how the enforcement threats outlined below stem directly from 
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1.  Strategic Publicity 
By publicly revealing the IRS’s ex post enforcement actions, 
mandatory public disclosure of complete tax return information would 
diminish the government’s ability to strategically publicize its tax 
enforcement strengths in order to shape the perceptions and compliance 
behavior of individual taxpayers. As I have shown in prior work, the 
government deliberately publicizes specific examples of its tax 
enforcement strengths—audits, tax penalties, and tax litigation victories—
without revealing specific examples of its tax enforcement weaknesses.164 
As salient examples involving named individuals have greater potential to 
affect individuals’ perceptions and decisions than anonymous statistics, the 
government utilizes the “strategic publicity function” of individual tax 
privacy to encourage an inflated perception of the government’s ability to 
detect tax offenses, punish their perpetrators, and compel all but a few 
outliers to comply.165 If the curtain of tax privacy were raised, however, 
individuals would observe specific examples of weaknesses in the IRS’s ex 
post tax enforcement efforts that would challenge this perception.166 
The government actively attempts to shape the perceptions of 
individuals regarding key elements of tax enforcement by placing specific 
examples of strong tax enforcement actions in front of the curtain of tax 
privacy. For example, as Daniel Levin and I found in an empirical study 
covering a seven-year period, during the two weeks leading up to April 
15th, “Tax Day,” the government issued more than double the number of 
press releases describing tax enforcement actions against specific named 
individuals, including many celebrities and other high profile taxpayers, per 
week than it did during the rest of the year.167 In addition, individuals may 
perceive that tax penalties are significantly greater than they actually are, in 
 
the ex post nature of the IRS actions that mandatory public disclosure would reveal. Second, I examine 
how and whether each enforcement threat would occur in the context of public disclosure of both 
individual and corporate tax return information. 
 164. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 328; Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. 
Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2010). 
 165. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 328. 
 166. See id.  
 167. Blank & Levin, supra note 164, at 8. For the time window ranging from April 1 to April 15, 
we found that the government issued 128% more tax enforcement press releases per week than during 
the rest of the year. Id. “The negative binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square [was] 
23.48 . . . .” Id. at 16. The p-value was only .0000013 (meaning a one-in-791,637 chance of 
randomness). Id.  
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part because their primary exposure to tax penalties today is to memorable 
examples of specific taxpayers who are sentenced to prison for engaging in 
tax fraud or who pay high civil tax penalties.168 And individuals may 
believe that a challenge from the IRS will lead to a government victory in 
court because the government wins the overwhelming majority of publicly 
announced civil tax controversies and nearly all criminal tax cases.169 
In reality, the IRS lacks the resources to audit all tax returns or even 
pursue tax penalties and litigation in many of the cases of tax 
noncompliance that it is able to detect.170 Public disclosure of individuals’ 
complete tax return information, which would include the settlement forms 
described earlier, would reveal specific examples of the IRS’s ex post 
enforcement actions. These many examples could alter individuals’ 
perceptions of the IRS’s tax enforcement capabilities. In the absence of tax 
privacy, the media and other intermediaries—and ultimately ordinary 
citizens—would observe concrete examples of taxpayers who may have 
engaged in abusive tax activities, yet were not audited by the IRS, or who, 
if they were audited, paid little or no tax penalties.171 Without the curtain of 
tax privacy, the media would likely focus on the many specific tax 
controversies in which the government regularly chooses to make legal 
concessions rather than litigate.172 
Public disclosure of the IRS’s ex post enforcement actions poses 
significant threats to individual tax compliance. Publicity of examples of 
strong tax enforcement against specific taxpayers can inflate taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the two principal determinants of deterrence: the probability 
of detection and the expected costs of noncompliance.173 Survey data 
reveals that individuals greatly overestimate the actual likelihood of IRS 
detection. While the audit rate for individual taxpayers is less than 1%, 
 
 168. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former UBS Client Pays $20.8 Million Penalty for 
Hiding over $41 Million in Swiss Bank Accounts (Sept. 21, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/archive/ 
usao/nys/pressreleases/September10/robbinsjulessentencingpr.pdf. See also Blank & Levin, supra note 
164, at 18. 
 169. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 301. In 2007 and 2010, for instance, the 
U.S. Department of Justice won 100% of all litigated federal criminal tax cases. See TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP’T OF TREASURY, REFERENCE NO. 2010-30-059, ACCURACY-
RELATED PENALTIES ARE SELDOM CONSIDERED PROPERLY DURING CORRESPONDENCE AUDITS 5 
(2010). 
 170. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 138, at iii. 
 171. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 169, at 5 (IRS failed to 
consider accuracy tax penalties in 92% of cases).  
 172. See generally Williams, supra note 146. 
 173. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 303–13.  
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studies of taxpayer perceptions of the IRS’s audit rate show that some 
individuals believe it is as high as nearly 50%.174 In a public access regime, 
salient examples of weak tax enforcement against specific taxpayers could 
have the opposite effect on individuals’ perceptions and tax compliance 
decisions. The strategic publicity function also supports the government’s 
efforts to increase confidence among compliant individuals who are 
motivated by feelings of reciprocity, but who will comply with the tax 
system only if they believe that other taxpayers are paying their taxes 
honestly.175 Without tax privacy, visible examples of the government’s 
failure to catch and penalize noncompliant taxpayers could have negative 
tax compliance effects on individuals whose compliance is conditional on 
that of others.176 
Does tax privacy offer similar strategic publicity advantages to the 
government when it attempts to increase tax compliance among 
corporations? An initial intuition may be that the government utilizes the 
curtain of tax privacy strategically by publicizing specific examples of 
corporate tax enforcement to influence corporate tax directors’ perceptions 
of the risk of tax audits, tax penalties, and tax controversy losses. Tax 
directors, after all, are also subject to cognitive biases that can cause them 
to make seemingly irrational decisions. 
As a result of distinctions between individuals and corporate tax 
directors, however, raising the curtain of tax privacy would likely have 
little impact on these actors’ perceptions of the risk of IRS enforcement in 
many areas. While the IRS highlights its efforts to detect abuse publicly,177 
corporate tax directors already expect that their corporations will be subject 
to heightened scrutiny by the IRS.178 ExxonMobil Corporation, for 
 
 174. See Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: 
A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 222 (1982) (finding 37.9% of 
individuals believed they would be caught if they attempted to evade tax); John T. Scholz & Neil 
Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 490, 497–98 (1995) (finding individuals believed that the probability that their tax returns would be 
audited by the IRS was 48%, were they to file false returns). 
 175. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passé? Homo Reciprocans and the Future 
of Egalitarian Politics, BOS. REV., Dec. 1998–Jan. 1999, at 4; Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: 
Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 81–83 (2003). 
 176. See Blank, Individual Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 269. 
 177. See, e.g., Patrick Temple-West, UPDATE 1-U.S. IRS Forms ‘SWAT Team’ for Tax Dodger 
Crackdown, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tax-irs-transfer-
idUSL1E8EKHU220120320. 
 178. See Amy S. Elliott, News Analysis: Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs 
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example, provides office space at its Houston headquarters to dozens of 
IRS agents who engage in “full-time audit[s]” of the corporation’s books 
and tax returns.179 Moreover, although a public access regime would enable 
corporate tax directors to observe that the IRS rarely imposes most tax 
penalties, this revelation would only reinforce corporate tax directors’ 
current knowledge and beliefs based on their substantial repeat experience 
in negotiating with the IRS.180 And while government officials have 
boasted of overwhelming odds181 in their favor in corporate tax cases, 
corporate tax directors know from experience that the government’s ability 
to win corporate tax abuse controversies is not certain. Over the course of 
the last decade, the government has lost high-profile corporate tax abuse 
cases at the trial level, only to win later on appeal, and vice versa.182 
2.  Benchmarking 
Another potential tax enforcement cost of mandatory public disclosure 
of tax return information is that it could unintentionally encourage 
aggressive tax planning. By shielding complete tax returns from public 
view, the curtain of tax privacy prevents interested parties—shareholders, 
corporate managers, and even individual taxpayers—from establishing 
benchmarks of aggressiveness in several tax compliance areas and from 
pressuring their agents to pursue more aggressive strategies to keep pace 
with the tax planning of others. Mandatory public disclosure of complete 
tax returns would reveal information about other taxpayers’ tax positions—
and the IRS’s ex post responses to these positions—which, in turn, could 
encourage benchmarking.183 
In the corporate context, mandatory public disclosure of complete tax 
returns would reveal significant information about a corporation’s tax 
planning and reporting practices that is not observable today. Although the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requires all publicly 
 
Escape the IRS, 136 TAX NOTES 351 (2012). 
 179. See Charles Riley, The American Tax Machine, CNN (May 24, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2011/05/24/news/economy/corporate_tax_reform/. 
 180. For discussion, see David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99 
TAX NOTES 1503, 1503–04 (2003). 
 181. Alix Stuart, Don’t Mess with the IRS, CFO (July 15, 2008), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-
tax/2008/07/dont-mess-with-the-irs/ (quoting then-IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb). 
 182. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. 
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 
1014 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 183. For additional discussion, see Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 62–69. 
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traded corporations to publish detailed non-tax financial information, tax 
privacy obscures nearly all tax return information from public view.184 
Mandatory public disclosure of complete corporate tax returns, a frequent 
proposal of tax law scholars and policymakers,185 would expose documents 
that could enable shareholders to determine whether competitor 
corporations had engaged in specific related party transfer pricing 
strategies186 or had engaged in tax strategies with uncertain legal 
outcomes.187 
Armed with this newly available information, significant shareholders 
of corporations that have not engaged in these strategies could pressure 
their corporate managers to consider adopting more aggressive transfer 
pricing strategies. As another example, public access to corporations’ 
“reportable transaction” disclosure forms, which corporations are required 
to file with the IRS, could lead activist investors, non-tax managers, 
significant shareholders, and corporate tax directors to compare their own 
corporation’s tax aggressiveness and tax reporting methods to those of 
other corporations.188 An adverse effect of mandatory public disclosure, 
thus, is that it could lead to increased external pressure that would likely 
influence the tax planning and reporting of corporate tax directors toward 
increased tax aggressiveness. 
Activist investors, such as private equity and hedge funds, and non-tax 
managers would be especially likely to scour publicly available corporate 
tax return information to create intercorporate comparisons of tax planning 
that could lead to such pressure. In recent years, activist hedge funds have 
analyzed available information about their own portfolio corporations’ tax 
planning and have often recommended specific actions.189 Campaigns by 
private equity investors include efforts to encourage their corporations to 
engage in conversions to Real Estate Investment Trusts, tax-free split-offs 
 
 184. See, e.g., Blank, Corporate Tax Privacy, supra note 29, at 45–48; Michelle Hanlon, What 
Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable Income from Its Financial Statements?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 831, 
832 (2003). 
 185. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 10, at 627; Bartlett, supra note 116; Rampell, 
supra note 10; Salmon, supra note 24; Thorndike, Show Us the Money, supra note 10. 
 186. See, e.g., IRS Form 5471; IRS Form 5472. 
 187. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE UTP 
(FORM 1120) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120utp.pdf. 
 188. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (2014) (describing reportable transactions). 
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of significant businesses,190 and, most recently, corporate inversion 
mergers to reduce their U.S. tax liability.191 A consequence of public 
disclosure of tax return information of all corporations is that these 
investors would gain the ability to evaluate their own corporation’s relative 
tax aggressiveness in transfer pricing, potentially abusive tax strategies, and 
methods of disclosure to the IRS, among others. 
In addition, third parties, such as tax advisory firms, would have a 
significant financial incentive to evaluate all publicly available corporate 
tax return information in order to assist non-tax managers and corporate tax 
directors in meeting benchmarks of tax aggressiveness. This analysis would 
likely incorporate whether corporations pursued transactions identified by 
the IRS as potentially abusive and whether the IRS responded ex post to the 
resulting tax positions. For example, today, each of the major national 
accounting firms has a “benchmarking department,” which aids corporate 
management in evaluating their own corporation’s performance in areas 
such as executive compensation and staffing costs compared to those of 
other similar corporations.192 Mandatory public disclosure of complete 
corporate tax returns would allow these third parties to provide “tax 
efficiency” benchmarking services to encourage conservative tax directors 
to consider strategies exhibited by their more aggressive counterparts. 
The threat of benchmarking could also occur in response to mandatory 
public disclosure of individual tax return information among certain 
individuals. As a result of their status as wage earners and their inflated 
perceptions of the IRS’s enforcement,193 many individual taxpayers do not 
attempt to avoid taxes other than through blatant abuse, such as non-filing, 
 
 190. See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Hedge Fund Presses Case for Breakup of Darden 
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underreporting, or tax fraud.194 However, a small group of wealthy and 
sophisticated individual taxpayers regularly attempt to minimize their tax 
liabilities through aggressive income tax and estate and gift tax planning 
techniques.195 While these individuals do not have shareholders or owners 
who exert external pressure on them, some of these individuals appear to 
respond to internal pressure to avoid paying more tax than their peers. This 
reaction is consistent with reciprocity theory.196 Public disclosure of 
complete individual tax returns of others would reveal to some wealthy 
individuals that their peers have adopted certain tax avoidance strategies 
which they have not considered, such as estate planning vehicles, Roth IRA 
conversions, and choices of business entities that limit payroll tax 
liabilities. Public disclosure of this information could cause wealthy and 
sophisticated individuals to pressure their accountants and advisors to 
engage in similar strategies, especially where the IRS has not challenged 
the tax positions. 
When considering public disclosure proposals, policymakers should 
evaluate whether a proposed measure would reveal specific tax planning 
information that would encourage benchmarking. Regarding publicly 
traded corporations, I have argued elsewhere that public disclosure of 
certain documents, such as the one-page Form 1120, Schedule M-3, and a 
summary “pink slip” containing basic tax information, would be unlikely to 
reveal new information that would lead to benchmarking effects if subject 
to mandatory public disclosure.197 Yet others, such as proposals to require 
public disclosure of complete tax returns, would enable granular 
comparative analyses of tax aggressiveness in specific areas. 
3.  Reverse Engineering 
By revealing all ex post tax enforcement decisions of the IRS through 
the release of certain forms and other documents, mandatory public 
disclosure of complete tax returns would also enable taxpayers and their 
advisors to reverse engineer the IRS’s strategies for detecting and 
 
 194. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rhode Island Machine Shop Owners Convicted of 
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challenging abusive tax positions. Mandatory public disclosure of complete 
tax returns would display the IRS’s ex post treatment of all taxpayers’ tax 
returns, including the vast majority of tax returns and tax positions that the 
IRS did not audit or challenge. By exposing the IRS’s playbook to 
taxpayers, advisors, and analysts indirectly, mandatory public disclosure 
could hinder the IRS’s efforts to deter and detect aggressive tax planning. 
The potential for reverse engineering in response to public disclosure 
of complete tax return information is especially relevant among corporate 
taxpayers, where legal ambiguity often encourages aggressive tax planning. 
Mandatory public disclosure of complete tax return information would 
enable sophisticated analysts to observe the details of tax controversies 
where the IRS asserted tax deficiencies, imposed tax penalties, and agreed 
to settlements with corporations. Many corporate tax directors and their 
advisors, for instance, have expressed “uncertainty”198 and “anxiety”199 
regarding the factors that the IRS uses to determine whether to apply a 40% 
strict liability tax penalty for transactions that lack “economic 
substance.”200 With access to complete tax returns, including IRS Form 
5701 and IRS Form 4549, corporate tax directors could observe whether 
corporations’ use of specific transfer pricing structures or tax avoidance 
products cause the IRS to audit and challenge these tax positions or to seek 
anti-abuse tax penalties ex post. This newfound knowledge—which would 
stem from the use of quantitative, not solely qualitative, measures—could 
lead some tax directors to refrain from pursuing strategies likely to draw 
IRS attention. It also could cause some tax directors to realize that they 
should adopt more aggressive tax strategies than they have historically, as 
these strategies do not appear to have resulted in challenges from the IRS. 
Public disclosure of complete tax return information could similarly 
lead to reverse engineering by wealthy and sophisticated individuals who 
also engage in tax planning that exploits legal ambiguity. For these 
individuals, the threshold levels of tax avoidance necessary to trigger IRS 
detection are uncertain in areas such as use of Subchapter S corporations to 
avoid payroll taxes,201 charitable contributions of appreciated property like 
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artwork,202 and characterization of household service providers as 
independent contractors rather than employees.203 Uncertainty aversion 
may cause some of these individuals to comply with the tax law.204 The 
potential for reverse engineering to alleviate this uncertainty could 
encourage some of these individual taxpayers to increase their use of 
aggressive tax avoidance strategies. 
With the ability to observe the ex post enforcement actions of the IRS 
through public disclosure of complete tax return information, tax advisory 
and data analysis firms would gain increased opportunity to create 
statistical models that show which types of tax positions are most likely to 
result in detection and successful challenge by the IRS. For instance, in 
light of the empirical possibilities offered by public disclosure, corporate 
tax directors and wealthy individuals could demand predictive models from 
the major accounting and other tax advisory firms that analyze whether 
certain tax reporting and filing actions in different circumstances would 
cause the IRS to utilize audits, deficiency assertions, and tax penalties. The 
major accounting firms currently do not publicize the use of such models 
using client data, possibly due to contractual restrictions on using clients’ 
return information or out of concern that this action could attract scrutiny 
from regulators or Congress.205 The introduction of mandatory public 
disclosure of tax return information, however, could provide these firms 
with an opening to market statistical modeling of IRS behavior. Public 
availability of tax return data would likely also result in competition from 
data analysis groups, such as Audit Analytics206 and others,207 that do not 
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offer tax advisory services currently. 
Several examples offer a window into possible uses of publicly 
disclosed tax return information to produce predictive modeling of tax 
enforcement. In a recent study, Jacob Thornock and others attempted to 
examine how the IRS selects taxpayers to examine or what information it 
uses in its enforcement mission.208 Their study focused on the IRS’s 
approach to investigating corporate taxpayers by reviewing the timing and 
frequency of reviews of publicly filed SEC annual reports by IRS agents 
(the SEC provided the data regarding IRS downloads in response to a 
Freedom of Information Act request).209 The researchers then analyzed 
whether certain firm-specific characteristics, such as changes in net 
operating losses and cash holdings, were statistically more likely to result 
in attention by the IRS.210 As another example, when individuals use 
TurboTax, a popular tax preparation program, to complete their personal 
tax returns, the software indicates whether the probability of an IRS audit is 
high or low using its “Audit Risk Meter.”211 Public disclosure of complete 
tax returns would enable similar, but more detailed and sophisticated 
predictions regarding the factors that lead the IRS to pursue audits, 
deficiency assessments, and tax penalties. 
Public disclosure of complete tax returns, thus, raises the same 
concern as disclosure of factors that contribute to the IRS’s DIF score and 
other mechanisms the IRS uses for selecting tax returns for audit. Congress 
has recognized the potential enforcement risks of publicizing this 
information, providing that the IRS shall not be required to disclose to 
taxpayers “standards used or to be used for the selection of returns for 
examination, or data used or to be used for determining such 
standards . . . .”212 Courts have similarly recognized the IRS’s need to 
redact information from legally required public disclosures if they would 
reveal the “scope, direction, or emphasis of audit activity.”213 Policymakers 
should apply similar treatment to proposals that would expose information 
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critical to the IRS’s enforcement strategies through reverse engineering. 
C.  WHY EX ANTE TAX ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE PUBLIC 
When evaluating tax return information that could be subject to 
mandatory public disclosure in service of increased tax transparency, 
policymakers should consider characteristics that differentiate ex post tax 
enforcement from ex ante tax administration. From the perspective of a 
principal that seeks to hold its agent accountable without impeding the 
agent from completing its assigned responsibilities, there is a more 
compelling case for mandatory public disclosure of IRS actions that 
constitute ex ante tax administration than that represent ex post tax 
enforcement. Three primary justifications for mandatory public disclosure 
of documents that would reveal ex ante tax administration are discussed 
below: sociological legitimacy of the IRS; efficiency; and absence of 
threats to the IRS’s enforcement capabilities. 
1.  Sociological Legitimacy 
Sociological legitimacy is a core objective for any administrative 
agency, including the IRS. Compared to models of legitimacy that depend 
on moral or legal authority, the sociological legitimacy of an action or 
institution of the government hinges on whether “the relevant public 
regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for 
reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”214 
Some individuals fail to comply with existing tax law when they view the 
law or the institution that applies it as illegitimate.215 A lack of sociological 
legitimacy may also hamper the IRS’s attempts to propose new rules and 
regulations without encountering significant skepticism and delay.216 And 
when legislators, on behalf of their constituents, reject the legitimacy of 
certain actions of the IRS, they may respond by denying the agency’s 
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budgetary requests.217 Several features of the absence of tax transparency 
of ex ante tax administration present a greater threat to the sociological 
legitimacy of the IRS than preservation of current tax privacy rules for acts 
of ex post tax enforcement. 
Secret Tax Law. Without tax transparency, taxpayers may perceive 
that the IRS lacks legitimacy by creating secret tax law through the 
issuance of advance tax rulings. In response to this concern, Congress 
provided in Section 6110 of the Internal Revenue Code that “written 
determinations,” such as private letter rulings, should be open to public 
inspection.218 In enacting this provision, Congress explicitly sought to 
counter the public perception of the development of secret tax law. Prior to 
the enactment of this statute, when only the taxpayers and advisors who 
requested private letter rulings had “special access to these rules of law,”219 
Congress believed that the lack of public disclosure “tended to reduce 
public confidence in the tax laws.”220 
As a result of its unique bargaining position, the IRS has greater 
freedom to express and apply its own interpretation of the tax law when 
issuing advance tax rulings than when challenging a tax position ex post. In 
a tax deficiency dispute following an audit, the IRS Appeals Division often 
concedes legal issues to the taxpayer, as illustrated by its high settlement 
rate.221 In contrast, when a taxpayer seeks a private letter ruling regarding a 
proposed transaction, the taxpayer will wait to pursue the transaction until 
the IRS issues its ruling. For example, in January 2015, Yahoo Inc. 
announced that it would distribute its stock in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. 
in a tax-free spin-off transaction, enabling Yahoo to avoid over $16 billion 
in tax liability and that it would seek a private letter ruling.222 Shortly 
thereafter, the IRS announced that it would refrain from issuing private 
letter rulings involving this type of spin-off transaction where the active 
trade or business of the distributing corporation or the controlled 
corporation is small compared to other assets.223 Not only did the Yahoo-
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Alibaba transaction come to a halt, but within minutes of the announcement 
from the IRS, the stock price of Yahoo plummeted by more than 10%.224 
Eventually, the potential multi-billion dollar tax risk, exacerbated by the 
absence of a private letter ruling, caused Yahoo to abandon its proposed tax 
strategy.225 As a result of its power in exercising discretion to issue a 
private letter ruling, the IRS can, and often does, require the taxpayer to 
make representations regarding its future activities that exceed statutory 
requirements.226 It can rule without concern that the taxpayer will later 
challenge the IRS in settlement negotiations or in court. Only public 
disclosure can allow all taxpayers to observe the IRS’s ex ante 
interpretations of the tax law. 
Through public disclosure, the public and policymakers can engage in 
debate regarding the legal interpretations of the IRS as expressed in ex ante 
tax administration, which would contradict the perception that the IRS 
creates tax law in secret and without accountability. For instance, in 2008 
and 2009, the IRS issued several notices that applied prospectively and 
altered the application of Section 382 of the Code, which governs the use 
of net operating losses following an ownership change, for corporations 
that participated in the government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program.227 
Following the public issuances of these notices, members of Congress held 
hearings, requested additional information from the IRS, and even 
introduced legislation that sought to nullify the notices.228 While some 
questioned whether the IRS acted in a manner that was consistent with the 
relevant statutory tax law or any grant of authority from Congress,229 the 
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ability of all taxpayers to observe these rulings through public disclosure 
spurred Congress to engage in this debate. If, on the other hand, tax privacy 
had prevented taxpayers from learning of these legal rulings until years 
later, if at all, public distrust of the IRS could have grown. 
Equity. Without tax transparency, the public may perceive that the IRS 
treats taxpayers inequitably when issuing advance tax rulings and 
approvals. Because the IRS dictates the issues upon which it will deliver 
advance tax rulings, requires taxpayers to follow uniform guidelines in 
submitting representations and supporting information, and reviews all 
ruling requests, taxpayers are justified in expecting the IRS to treat 
similarly situated taxpayers equally. 
Mandatory public disclosure enables taxpayers to determine whether 
the IRS has met this equity standard. Some courts have even held that 
while taxpayers are restricted from relying on private letter rulings issued 
to other taxpayers as precedent,230 they can introduce private letter rulings 
as evidence that the IRS has abused its discretion in issuing different 
rulings to two directly competing taxpayers. For example, in the 1960s, 
IBM and its main competitor, Remington Rand, requested private letter 
rulings from the IRS regarding identical products within weeks of one 
another.231 The IRS issued a favorable ruling to Remington Rand, but did 
not issue a favorable ruling to IBM.232 The Court of Claims allowed IBM 
to introduce this disparity as evidence and recover taxes that it paid from 
the IRS.233 Without public disclosure, taxpayers could suspect that even 
though the IRS has defined the requirements for requesting and obtaining a 
private letter ruling in as uniform a manner as possible, it uses the curtain 
of tax privacy as a way to apply the tax law differently to similar facts. 
There is a lower risk of public perception of inequitable treatment in 
the case of ex post tax enforcement. Just as a police officer stops only a 
small subset of drivers who exceed the posted speed limit,234 the IRS audits 
only a sliver of all tax returns.235 Taxpayers who are aware of the existence 
of an “audit lottery” know that the IRS will not apply the tax law equally to 
similarly situated taxpayers simply because it will not audit all tax returns. 
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And in contrast to advance tax rulings, where the IRS requires uniform 
representations and supporting evidence from taxpayers on a narrowly 
defined set of issues, ex post audits are more likely to involve divergent 
facts, especially where the IRS has selected a tax return for audit as a result 
of multiple instances of tax noncompliance. Some fact patterns will make it 
more likely that the IRS can prevail in court than others. For these reasons, 
courts have consistently held that the IRS does not owe taxpayers a “duty 
of consistency” when selecting tax returns for audits or entering into 
settlement agreements.236 
Integrity. Non-disclosure of ex ante tax administration also threatens 
the sociological legitimacy of the IRS by causing the public to question the 
agency’s integrity. Private letter rulings and Advance Pricing Agreements 
are frequently characterized as “tax deals.”237 The use of the term “deals” 
implies that the IRS acts as a partner with the taxpayer by facilitating its tax 
strategies prospectively. Private letter rulings and Advance Pricing 
Agreements function in the same manner as tax insurance, but taxpayers 
can obtain this insurance with significantly less expense from the IRS than 
from third-party insurers.238 Despite the IRS’s relatively strong bargaining 
power compared to taxpayers when negotiating advance tax rulings and 
agreements, the public may perceive that, under these circumstances, the 
IRS makes costly concessions or, worse, engages in impropriety. 
Mandatory public disclosure of ex ante tax administration, consequently, is 
essential to protecting the integrity of the IRS in the eyes of the public. 
Lack of transparency in the advance ruling context can also encourage 
suspicions of impropriety, as taxpayers may perceive that IRS officials 
favor specific taxpayers. For example, in 2013, the Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) issued a report criticizing the 
IRS for failing to create policies that prevent taxpayers from directing their 
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private letter ruling requests to specific reviewing IRS attorneys.239 Under 
policies in effect at the time, an IRS attorney that received multiple 
requests for private letter rulings from a specific law firm could retain up to 
two-thirds of these letter ruling requests.240 While TIGTA reported no 
evidence of malfeasance or corruption, it warned the IRS that this policy 
could create the appearance that “practitioners could possibly manipulate 
the letter ruling process” by seeking “inappropriate favorable rulings.”241 
At least one tax practitioner defended the strategy of requesting particular 
IRS attorneys to review private letter ruling requests “not because he’s your 
buddy, but because he’s going to get to the right answer.”242 Without public 
disclosure, public perceptions of impropriety between tax officials and 
taxpayers involving ex ante tax administration would likely increase. 
The public is less likely to perceive the IRS has engaged in favoritism 
toward specific taxpayers or acts of impropriety during audits and 
negotiations over settlement agreements. In ex post tax enforcement 
situations, the transaction has already occurred. The IRS does not facilitate 
the transaction prospectively by assuring desired tax benefits. The 
consequences of the taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions may also have 
already had an effect in the taxpayer’s financial statements even before an 
audit by the IRS has occurred,243 reducing the stakes of a tax controversy 
compared to an advance tax ruling request. Further, increased levels of 
review involved in ex post tax enforcement situations, including by 
officials within the IRS Appeals Division, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation, and the U.S. Tax Court,244 reduce potential appearances of 
impropriety between taxpayers engaged in tax controversies and IRS 
officials. 
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2.  Efficiency 
In addition to preserving sociological legitimacy of the IRS, public 
disclosure of advance tax rulings and agreements supports a core rationale 
of these devices: to alleviate legal uncertainty and encourage efficient 
transactions. Some taxpayers forego business transactions as a result of tax 
uncertainty. By obtaining ex ante tax administration, such as a private letter 
ruling, a taxpayer generally can pursue its transaction without fear that the 
IRS will subsequently challenge the tax treatment of the transaction. 
Mandatory public disclosure of advance tax rulings encourages other 
taxpayers to seek these rulings themselves, which ultimately leads them to 
execute transactions free of distortions caused by tax law uncertainty. By 
publicly disclosing an advance tax ruling received by a taxpayer, the IRS 
reveals to other similarly situated taxpayers the specific legal issues and 
fact patterns on which it will rule. 
The IRS, for example, issues private letter rulings regarding 
“significant issues” in tax-free spin-off transactions, which are legal issues 
“the resolution of which is not essentially free from doubt and that is 
germane to determining the tax consequences of the transaction.”245 As 
discussed earlier, in January 2015, Yahoo Inc. announced its decision to 
distribute its stock in Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. in a multi-billion dollar 
tax-free spin-off transaction.246 Even though Yahoo’s proposed spin-off 
transaction involved significant legal uncertainty regarding the “active 
trade or business” requirement, Yahoo announced the transaction and 
requested a private letter ruling after a competitor corporation, Liberty 
Interactive, participated in a similar transaction involving TripAdvisor, a 
portfolio corporation.247 As one commentator noted at the time of the 
Yahoo-Alibaba announcement, “Yahoo likely would not have pursued its 
planned transaction in the first place had it not been bolstered by a recent 
letter ruling . . . blessing what is believed to be the spinoff by Liberty 
Interactive Corp. of TripAdvisor Inc.”248 
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Even if taxpayers do not request advance tax rulings or enter into 
advance tax agreements, public disclosure of these actions alleviates legal 
uncertainty and can encourage efficient transactions. While taxpayers 
cannot rely on other taxpayers’ private letter rulings as binding 
precedent,249 they can look to these rulings for guidance regarding the 
IRS’s own interpretation of ambiguous tax law issues. For instance, in 
2014, the IRS announced that it would suspend its private letter ruling 
program regarding activities that are “qualifying income” by master limited 
partnerships, which would be necessary in order for these entities to retain 
partnership status for tax purposes.250 Taxpayers commented that the lack 
of private letter rulings would deter efficient business transactions, 
especially in the oil and gas industry.251 When the IRS resumed issuing 
private letter rulings on this issue in 2015, taxpayers and their advisors 
were eager to observe the IRS’s “workable standards” as applied in rulings, 
even if they did not plan to request the rulings themselves.252 
Additionally, the representations that the IRS requires taxpayers to 
submit before receiving a private letter ruling, which are currently open to 
public inspection, often reduce legal ambiguity by becoming the default 
interpretation that taxpayers rely on in pursuing transactions. For instance, 
the IRS’s required representation regarding the “substantially all” 
requirement of certain tax-free reorganizations has become the de facto 
legal rule that taxpayers seek to satisfy.253 Without public disclosure of 
these representations in private letter rulings, the legal uncertainty 
surrounding this issue, and many others, could prevent taxpayers from 
pursuing certain forms of corporate mergers and acquisitions. 
Contrary to the increased efficiency that results from public disclosure 
of advance tax rulings, public disclosure of documents that reveal the IRS’s 
ex post tax enforcement could encourage wasteful tax planning. Public 
disclosure of complete tax return information, as discussed earlier, would 
enable taxpayers to determine the IRS’s tax enforcement approaches, rather 
than reveal issues on which the IRS will provide an advance tax ruling that 
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could facilitate a non-tax motivated transaction.254 The consequence of 
such reverse engineering is that taxpayers may pursue tax avoidance 
strategies that do not result in IRS detection or challenge, a distortion of 
taxpayer behavior. Moreover, public disclosure of ex post tax enforcement 
would reduce legal uncertainty in situations where Congress deliberately 
enacted legally ambiguous standards in order to deter taxpayers from 
pursuing aggressive tax planning. For instance, public disclosure of 
complete tax return information would reveal circumstances under which 
the IRS applies the 40% economic substance tax penalty, undermining the 
efficacy of this particular tax penalty.255 As this example illustrates, public 
disclosure should be utilized as a means of reducing tax law uncertainty, 
but only where this effect is desirable from an efficiency perspective. 
3.  Absence of Enforcement Risk 
Mandatory public release of documents that would expose ex ante tax 
administration do not pose the same threats to tax enforcement and 
administration—such as interference with the IRS’s strategic publicity 
efforts, initiation of benchmarking by taxpayers, and facilitation of reverse 
engineering by taxpayers, their advisors, and financially incentivized third 
parties—as mandatory public disclosure of documents that would show ex 
post enforcement actions. 
Strategic Publicity. While public release of complete tax return 
information would offer specific examples of the IRS’s failure to audit 
certain taxpayers, apply tax penalties, and pursue litigation in most tax 
controversies,256 public disclosure of advance rulings, agreements, and 
approvals would not offer comparable examples of these weaknesses. 
Advance tax rulings affect a narrow set of legal issues on which the 
IRS consents to provide rulings in advance, which bear little relationship to 
factors that influence many individuals’ tax compliance decisions.257 It is 
highly unlikely, for instance, that an individual taxpayer’s perceptions 
regarding whether the IRS will pursue civil or criminal fraud tax penalties 
cases involving small offshore bank accounts is affected in any meaningful 
way by the public release of a private letter ruling that states that a 
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corporation can engage in a tax-free reorganization under Section 
368(a)(1)(F) of the Code even though shareholders will sell stock of the 
corporation immediately after the reorganization.258 Unlike public 
disclosure of complete tax return information, including the results of 
settlements involving offshore bank accounts and other forms of tax 
avoidance and evasion,259 public disclosure advance tax rulings would not 
reveal the IRS’s capacity to audit tax returns or apply tax penalties. 
Second, unlike ex post tax controversies, the IRS retains discretion to 
refrain from issuing advance tax rulings or entering into advance tax 
agreements. Because the IRS lacks the resources to litigate every instance 
of tax avoidance it identifies, it deploys mass settlement programs, such as 
the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,260 that allows many taxpayers 
to obtain favorable terms compared to the possible results of litigation. 
Public disclosure of complete tax returns would reveal the results of these 
settlements involving specific taxpayers, including many highly salient 
examples.261 On the other hand, if the IRS does not consider the facts of a 
specific taxpayer’s proposed transaction to merit a publicly accessible 
advance tax ruling, including taking into account the effects on the tax 
planning of other taxpayers, the IRS can decline to issue the ruling.262 
Last, unlike mandatory public disclosure of the terms of tax deficiency 
settlement agreements with specific taxpayers, public disclosure of advance 
tax rulings explicitly state that taxpayers have complied with the relevant 
tax law. After reciting the taxpayers’ representations, many private letter 
rulings conclude with approving language from the IRS, such as “we have 
determined that you fulfilled the requirements”263 or “we conclude that the 
proposed modifications comply.”264 Compared to public disclosure of ex 
post IRS settlements that highlight taxpayers’ noncompliance, public 
disclosure of private letter rulings bolster the perception that the taxpayers 
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requesting the ruling will engage in de facto tax compliance rather than 
illegitimate tax avoidance. 
Benchmarking. Mandatory public release of the IRS’s advance tax 
rulings and agreements also poses little risk of encouraging taxpayers to 
increase their use of tax avoidance strategies in order to meet benchmarks 
of tax aggressiveness.265 Unlike the tax positions that trigger audits and tax 
controversies over deficiency assertions, the issues that are the subject of 
advance tax rulings are not aggressive tax positions that rely on 
questionable interpretations of the tax law. Instead, private letter rulings 
often feature transactions where taxpayers seek assurance that they have 
satisfied the requirements of statutes that explicitly provide tax benefits, 
such as deferral of tax liability in tax-free reorganizations.266 Taxpayers 
seek private letter rulings when they claim conservative tax positions, 
especially because when doing so, they knowingly subject themselves to 
increased IRS scrutiny and multiple requests for voluminous 
information.267 
Reverse Engineering. Finally, public disclosure of advance tax rulings 
would not enable taxpayers, advisors, and other third parties to reverse 
engineer IRS’s enforcement strategies.268 Private letter rulings, advance tax 
agreements, and approvals do not offer indicia of the IRS’s methodology in 
selecting tax returns for audit, asserting tax deficiencies, or pursuing tax 
penalties. Instead of leading taxpayers and their advisors to attempt to 
determine the probability of enforcement by the IRS, including by 
developing statistical models, public disclosure of documents showing ex 
ante forms of tax administration would offer taxpayers and their advisors 
greater insights into whether their own circumstances are likely to result in 
a successful request for an advance tax ruling from the IRS.269 
D.  CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL APPLICATION 
A potential reaction to the analysis presented above is to question 
whether it can be generalized to jurisdictions other than the United States. 
 
 265. See supra notes 183–197 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Rev. Proc. 2015-3, 2015-1 I.R.B. 129. 
 267. See Jay Starkman, Applying for a Private Letter Ruling, J. OF ACCT., Jan. 2010, at 21. 
 268. See supra notes 198–213 and accompanying text. 
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Most countries do not permit public access to tax return and payment 
information of specific individual and business taxpayers.270 Like the 
United States, some countries, such as Japan, have experimented with 
mandatory public disclosure of tax return information for limited 
periods.271 Several Scandinavian jurisdictions, however, have long 
maintained expansive tax transparency policies, in which significant 
amounts of individual and business tax return information, as well as 
administrative actions of the taxing authority, are publicly accessible.272 
This Section briefly examines the public disclosure policies of one such 
country, Sweden, and draws from this example several factors that suggest 
when public disclosure of ex post tax information is unlikely to result in 
threats to tax enforcement and compliance. 
Tax Transparency in Sweden. For centuries, transparency by the 
government has been a hallmark trait of the Swedish legal system. Dating 
back to 1766, Swedish constitutional law provides that “every Swedish 
citizen shall be entitled to have free access to official documents, in order 
to encourage the free exchange of opinion and the availability of 
comprehensive information.”273 The default rule provides Swedish citizens 
with the right “to freely access almost all documents relating to the 
administration of justice and public administration” other than certain 
restricted information, such as documents that affect national security or 
criminal law enforcement.274 
Swedish law requires public disclosure of ex ante tax administration, 
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confidentiality policies of a variety of countries). 
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such as advance tax rulings issued regarding specific taxpayers.275 Both the 
taxpayer and the Swedish Tax Agency can request advance tax rulings 
from the Council for Advance Tax Rulings regarding the tax effects of 
proposed transactions.276 These advance tax rulings are published without 
information that identifies the taxpayer that requested them.277 
Yet unlike the United States, Sweden also mandates significant public 
disclosure of information that reveals ex post tax enforcement and 
decisions. Every year, the Swedish Tax Agency publishes the taxable 
income and tax liability of all Swedish taxpayers, both individuals and 
businesses, which are identified by name in its publicly accessible 
taxeringskalender (tax calendar).278 To protect taxpayers’ personal and 
proprietary information, Swedish law does not require public disclosure of 
tax returns themselves, which indicate sources of income, or the tax 
deductions that affect the calculation of taxable income, such as business 
expenses.279 More importantly, all ex post audits and adjustments of a 
taxpayer’s tax liability by the Swedish Tax Agency are publicly observable. 
Swedish law requires every “decision” of the taxing authority to be open to 
public inspection.280 If, for instance, the Swedish Tax Agency determines 
that a taxpayer has improperly claimed a tax deduction, this decision must 
be publicly disclosed.281 
There are several plausible hypotheses that explain how Sweden 
maintains such an expansive approach to tax transparency without 
appearing to threaten its taxing authority or its standing as a country with 
one of the highest tax compliance rates in the world.282 
Limited Opportunity to Exploit Public Information. Swedish taxpayers 
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have a lower ability to exploit information in publicly available decisions 
of the taxing authority than would be possible in the United States if 
taxpayers could review complete tax return information. In contrast to the 
IRS, which settles almost all tax disputes,283 the Swedish Tax Agency is 
prohibited by law from entering into any settlement negotiations or special 
agreements with taxpayers following an audit of the taxpayers’ returns.284 
Public disclosure of these decisions, consequently, poses a lower risk of 
encouraging taxpayers to pursue more aggressive tax strategies in order to 
match the approaches of taxpayers who received more favorable tax 
decisions from the taxing authority than others regarding the same type of 
transaction. And as the Swedish Tax Agency must treat all similarly 
situated taxpayers equally when reaching decisions, it does not have the 
same incentive as U.S. government officials to highlight certain tax 
enforcement actions over others in order to influence taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the consequences of tax noncompliance. 
Limited Opportunity for Tax Aggressiveness. Features of Swedish tax 
law create fewer opportunities for taxpayers to pursue aggressive and 
abusive tax strategies, generally, than in the United States. Under the U.S. 
self-assessment income tax system, individual taxpayers determine whether 
to pursue actions such as: filing a tax return, reporting income that is not 
subject to third-party reporting, paying self-employment taxes, paying 
household employee taxes, reporting other individuals as dependents, 
claiming special tax credits, among many other tax compliance acts.285 
Similarly, as U.S. corporations can claim valuable tax losses and other tax 
benefits that reduce their taxable income and tax liability without reducing 
their earnings for financial accounting purposes, corporate tax directors 
often face pressure, from shareholders and non-tax management, to pursue 
tax avoidance strategies.286 
Swedish taxpayers possess significantly less tax compliance 
discretion. The Swedish Tax Agency provides individual taxpayers with 
pre-completed income tax declaration forms, which most taxpayers simply 
confirm, often by sending a text message from their smart phones.287 In 
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addition, over 90% of Swedish individual income taxes are paid through a 
non-voluntary, third-party withholding system,288 and over 30% of 
Sweden’s tax revenue is attributable to a national value-added tax,289 which 
is significantly more difficult to evade than an income tax. For Swedish 
corporations, taxable business income is calculated using the same rules for 
calculation of income for financial accounting purposes, generally accepted 
accounting principles (“GAAP”).290 Uniformity of tax and financial 
accounting thus lessens the incentives of tax directors to reduce taxable 
income. As design of the tax system and choice of tax base limit the ability 
of Swedish taxpayers to increase tax aggressiveness and engage in tax 
noncompliance compared to taxpayers in the U.S., public disclosure of ex 
post tax decisions of the taxing authority poses less of a threat to tax 
enforcement in Sweden than in the U.S. 
Public Attitudes Toward Taxation and Taxing Authority. Finally, 
differences in public attitudes toward taxation and the taxing authority may 
partly explain why broad public disclosure of tax information in Sweden 
has not resulted in adverse tax compliance effects. By design, the U.S. 
voluntary compliance system is adversarial: taxpayers complete their own 
tax returns, can submit written justifications for not paying certain taxes, 
and can refrain from paying tax deficiencies until receiving a decision by 
the U.S. Tax Court.291 Taxpayers regularly express the sentiment best 
captured by Judge Learned Hand’s famous quote, that “any one may so 
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible . . . there is not 
even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”292 A significant number of 
U.S. taxpayers are also suspicious of the IRS, as recent surveys show that 
the IRS is the least popular federal government institution other than 
Congress.293 Public disclosure of complete tax return information would 
likely embolden some taxpayers’ distrust of the IRS, as specific examples 
of the agency’s weaknesses would attract significant media attention. 
Public attitudes toward taxation and the taxing authority are markedly 
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different in Sweden, even as ex post decisions of the Swedish Tax Agency 
are publicly accessible. In a 2015 survey, 83% of Swedish citizens reported 
that they have a favorable perception of the Swedish Tax Agency.294 In 
describing its citizens’ attitudes toward tax compliance, the Swedish 
government reports on its official website, 
Swedes are not naturally anti-tax . . . unlike in some countries where 
paying tax is seen as something negative, many Swedes tolerate – and 
even welcome – high taxes. In fact, the Swedish word for tax – skatt – 
has another meaning: treasure. There can’t be many languages in which 
the word for tax has such positive connotations.295 
Many factors may explain the differing attitudes toward taxation and 
the taxing authority in Sweden and the United States. Swedish citizens 
enjoy substantial government benefits in exchange for their tax dollars, 
such as universal healthcare, free public education, and generous retirement 
benefits.296 Additionally, Sweden’s status as a unitary state, compared to 
the federal system in the United States, supports citizens’ perception that 
their payment of tax dollars to the national government directly funds the 
government benefits they receive.297 Moreover, as the Swedish Tax 
Agency is required to treat taxpayers more uniformly than the IRS, and the 
Swedish tax system results in greater compliance by design,298 public 
disclosure of tax information itself may even bolster positive attitudes 
toward the taxing authority and the tax system. 
As this discussion illustrates, public disclosure of tax payment 
information and taxing authority decisions in Sweden does not appear to 
provoke a reaction of increased tax aggressiveness or evasion from 
taxpayers. From this case study, we can extract several attributes of a tax 
system that may limit the potential for public tax return information 
disclosure to impede tax enforcement: (1) low potential for disclosed tax 
information to be exploited by taxpayers in establishing benchmarks of tax 
aggressiveness or reverse engineering; (2) limited opportunities for 
taxpayers to engage in tax avoidance or evasion, irrespective of whether tax 
information is publicly disclosed; and (3) strong positive attitudes toward 
taxation and the taxing authority. None of these features are apparent in the 
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tax system of the United States, where the taxing authority lacks the 
necessary resources to audit most tax returns and does not face legal 
obligations to resolve similar deficiency disputes with taxpayers on equal 
terms.299 
III.  WHAT EX ANTE TAX ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE 
PUBLIC? 
After embracing the justifications for mandatory public disclosure of 
acts of ex ante tax administration, policymakers should next consider the 
precise types of documents and information that should be subject to such a 
policy. There are numerous possibilities. The IRS could be required to 
publicly disclose any “written determination” regarding a specific 
taxpayer.300 Or the policy could be limited to advance tax rulings involving 
certain types of taxpayers, such as business entities and not individuals. 
Release of the documents showing ex ante tax administration could also 
include or exclude the taxpayers’ identities. Alternatively, public disclosure 
could be mandated only when the IRS addresses a first impression issue. 
In contrast to current law, which only requires the IRS to publicly 
disclose instances in which it reaches an ex ante ruling regarding a specific 
taxpayer,301 this Part proposes that the IRS should be required to satisfy a 
new standard of openness in tax administration: “dual tax transparency.” 
Under this standard, in addition to being required to release written 
determinations,302 such as private letter rulings that often satisfy taxpayers’ 
requests,303 the IRS should also be obligated to publicly disclose 
information about situations where it declines to issue such rulings or enter 
into such agreements. Even if denials occur in forms other than written 
determinations, such as preliminary decisions or oral communication, dual 
tax transparency demands that these denials be accessible by the public. 
After explaining why dual tax transparency is necessary in order to 
achieve openness by the IRS regarding its ex ante legal interpretations and 
review processes, this Part shows how, in many cases, current statutory law 
and administrative procedures impede dual tax transparency. 
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A.  DUAL TAX TRANSPARENCY 
Dual tax transparency is critical to ensuring openness by the IRS 
regarding its ex ante legal interpretations and decisionmaking processes. If 
the public only observes advance rulings where the IRS agrees with the 
taxpayer’s requested treatment, it will gain a limited, and possibly 
distorted, understanding of the IRS’s interpretation of the tax law. An 
accurate understanding is important not only for taxpayers that may be 
considering submitting a request for a private letter ruling or agreement, 
but also to the public that desires to hold the IRS accountable for its 
actions.304 Dual tax transparency could also stimulate legislators to 
consider changes to statutes that are either so complex or so unintentionally 
uncertain that the IRS is unable to reach ex ante legal conclusions. And 
given the high economic, even existential, value of certain types of advance 
tax rulings and approvals, dual tax transparency is necessary to assure the 
public that the IRS is not unreasonably discriminating against any 
particular taxpayers in declining to issue such rulings and approvals. 
To consider why dual tax transparency is essential to an understanding 
of the IRS’s behavior in the ex ante tax administration context, consider the 
following hypothetical. Imagine that a group of researchers is attempting to 
identify the factors that influence high school students’ chances of gaining 
college admission to Hypo University, a prestigious national research 
institution.305 The researchers are specifically interested in pinpointing 
features of successful “personal statements,” written essays that students 
must submit to Hypo University as part of their applications. The 
researchers seek to analyze the personal statements among groups of 
applicants with otherwise identical characteristics, such as SAT scores, 
student activities, and class rank. If the researchers only examine the 
personal statements of high school students who were admitted to Hypo 
University, their findings will be highly questionable. The researchers 
might conclude, for instance, that personal statements that include 
references to historical political figures tend to lead to admission to Hypo 
University. But what about the unsuccessful personal statements? If the 
researchers review these personal statements as well, they could determine, 
for example, that statements that include references to favorite family pets 
are less likely than statements that discuss historical political figures to 
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correlate with admission. To identify trends, the researchers must review 
the personal statements of both successful and unsuccessful applicants. 
Empirical researchers consider selection bias in the collection of data 
to present the risk of creating distorted conclusions.306 When a researcher 
only reviews cases in which “outcome[s] of interest” have been achieved in 
order to attempt to determine the independent variables that affect the 
outcomes, the results are inconclusive.307 For this reason, empirical 
researchers do not select data based only on the dependent variable, the 
outcome.308 For example, in prior work, Nancy Staudt and I reviewed all 
corporate tax abuse cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between 
1909 and 2011 in an effort to understand the factors that result in a legal 
victory for the government in these cases.309 Rather than consider only 
cases where the Court agreed with the government, we reviewed all cases 
where the government alleged corporate tax abuse in its briefs filed with 
the Court.310 This strategy allowed us to review the entire collection of 
cases in which the Court could have found abuse in order to fully 
understand the outcomes.311 Without including both cases where the 
outcome of interest occurred and did not occur, the conclusions of our 
study, like the hypothetical study of college personal statements described 
above, would have been biased. 
Dual tax transparency is necessary in order to ensure that taxpayers 
and policymakers do not draw biased conclusions from limited samples of 
documents showing ex ante tax administration. In order to enable a 
comprehensive and accurate understanding of the IRS’s behavior when 
issuing advance tax rulings and approvals or entering into advance tax 
agreements, a public disclosure policy should mandate disclosure of the 
following types of information: 
Request. The policy should require public disclosure of the initial 
request for ex ante tax administration submitted by the taxpayer. In the 
private letter ruling context, for instance, this document is the private letter 
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ruling request.312 Whether the IRS should be required to disclose the 
identity of the requesting taxpayer depends on the objective of the specific 
public disclosure measure. In some cases, accountability objectives may 
necessitate public disclosure of the taxpayer’s identity. In other cases, the 
goal of fostering public understanding of the IRS’s legal interpretations 
may be possible without disclosure of the taxpayer’s identity. 
Outcome. Second, the policy should mandate public disclosure of the 
outcome of the taxpayer’s request. Possible outcomes are that the IRS 
grants the request, the IRS denies the request, or the taxpayer withdraws 
the request prior to a decision by the IRS.313 
Reasoning. Last, the policy should require the IRS to explain its 
analysis in reaching a decision. This information is necessary in order to 
enable the public to understand the IRS’s legal interpretation of the tax law, 
whether the IRS agrees or disagrees with the taxpayer’s proposed 
treatment. 
B.  APPLICATION 
While the tax law appears to require the IRS to publicly release 
documents showing ex ante tax administration,314 in many cases it does not 
mandate dual tax transparency, or any tax transparency at all. This Section 
considers whether dual tax transparency occurs in the IRS’s public 
disclosure practices regarding private letter ruling requests that taxpayers 
withdraw after submission to the IRS, tax-exempt status determinations 
where the IRS reaches an adverse decision, and Advance Pricing 
Agreements, irrespective of whether the IRS accepts the taxpayer’s 
proposed terms. 
1.  Withdrawn Private Letter Ruling Requests 
Based on a reading of current law, one might reasonably conclude that 
the IRS considers private letter ruling requests and issues rulings to specific 
taxpayers openly and transparently. Not only can the public access any 
private letter ruling,315 but any individual can submit a request to the IRS to 
review another taxpayer’s “background file” regarding an issued private 
letter ruling, which contains the taxpayer’s written private letter ruling 
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request, any written material submitted by the taxpayer in support of its 
request, and any written communication between the IRS and the taxpayer 
regarding the request.316 The publicly available private letter ruling 
information does not reveal the identity of the taxpayer that requested the 
ruling or any information that could allow others to identify the taxpayer.317 
Dual Tax Transparency. Current law, however, obscures from public 
view most private letter rulings where the IRS concludes that it will issue 
an adverse ruling to the taxpayer. 
A minuscule fraction of publicly released private letter rulings contain 
adverse rulings. For instance, in conducting research for this Article, I 
reviewed all 1,735 private letter rulings issued and publicly released by the 
IRS in 2006.318 I coded rulings as adverse where the IRS ruled the 
taxpayer’s proposed transaction or actions violated a statutory or regulatory 
requirement or where the IRS explicitly stated that it denied the taxpayer’s 
requested treatment. I found that the IRS reached adverse determinations in 
only 145 out of 1,735 (8.36%) of these rulings.319 
While taxpayers predominantly seek rulings from the IRS in situations 
where they have strong legal support, they also withdraw their private letter 
ruling requests if they conclude that the IRS will issue an adverse ruling.320 
Every taxpayer that submits a private letter ruling request to the IRS is 
entitled to at least one conference of right with representatives of the IRS 
Associate Chief Counsel’s office with subject matter jurisdiction over a 
particular area of the tax law.321 Following this conference, the IRS will 
indicate to the taxpayer if it will rule adversely and, if so, it will provide the 
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taxpayer with the option to withdraw the private letter ruling request.322 In 
Revenue Procedure 2015-1, the IRS’s own written policies and procedures 
regarding private letter ruling requests, the IRS states: 
Generally, after the conference of right is held but before the letter ruling 
is issued, the branch representative will orally notify the taxpayer or the 
taxpayer’s representative of the Associate office’s conclusions . . . If the 
Associate office is going to rule adversely, the taxpayer will be offered 
the opportunity to withdraw the letter ruling request.323 
The IRS’s own written procedures explicitly permit the taxpayer to 
withdraw the ruling request following oral notification of a potentially 
adverse private letter ruling.324 According to current and former employees 
of the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, “[a]s a practical matter, taxpayers 
withdraw their requests for rulings in virtually all situations in which the 
IRS indicates that an adverse ruling will be issued.”325 The ability of 
taxpayers to withdraw private letter ruling requests upon learning of 
potentially adverse rulings from the IRS prevents the IRS from issuing an 
official written determination, the document which is required by law to be 
open to public inspection. 
While the IRS appears to have created procedures for public 
disclosure of situations where a taxpayer has withdrawn a private letter 
ruling request, significant exceptions enable the IRS to refrain from public 
disclosure in most cases. If a taxpayer withdraws a private letter ruling 
request, the IRS Associate Chief Counsel’s representatives who reviewed 
the original ruling request may prepare a memorandum to IRS officials 
with jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s tax return describing the withdrawal, 
which may constitute publicly accessible Chief Counsel Advice.326 
However, two significant exceptions can prevent the submission and public 
disclosure of this memorandum. Under the IRS’s own procedures, the 
memorandum only constitutes publicly accessible Chief Counsel Advice if 
it “provides more than the fact that the request was withdrawn and that the 
Associate office was tentatively adverse.”327 Additionally, the IRS 
Associate Chief Counsel’s representatives will not prepare the 
memorandum if the taxpayer withdraws its private letter ruling request and 
 
 322. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 39. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Donald E. Osteen et al., Obtaining Private Guidance from the Internal Revenue Service, in 
U.S.C. LAW SCHOOL TAX INSTITUTE 17-1, 17-19 (2002). 
 326. Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 35. 
 327. Id. (emphasis added). 
 
506 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:449 
 
submits a written statement that its proposed transaction “has been, or is 
being, abandoned.”328 Put differently, after learning of the possibility of an 
adverse private letter ruling, a taxpayer can represent to the IRS that it will 
not pursue the proposed transaction. In this case, the IRS will not publicly 
disclose the taxpayer’s withdrawal of its ruling request. 
Examination of recent private letter ruling requests by taxpayers 
reveals that the IRS rarely discloses instances in which a taxpayer has 
withdrawn a private letter ruling request. While this Article does not 
present a comprehensive multi-year empirical study of the IRS’s private 
letter ruling practice, a preliminary review of the IRS’s publicly disclosed 
Chief Counsel Advice memoranda regarding withdrawn private letter 
ruling requests presents striking results. During 2002–2006, the IRS 
received, on average, 1,652 private letter ruling requests from taxpayers 
each year.329 In this time period, the IRS issued, on average, 1,332 private 
letter rulings to taxpayers.330 These figures show that the average number 
of withdrawn private letter ruling requests each year was 320.331 To 
conduct a preliminary review of the IRS’s public disclosure of withdrawn 
private letter ruling requests, I reviewed all 534 Chief Counsel Advice 
memoranda issued during the 2002–2006 period.332 I found that during this 
period, the IRS publicly released 2.4 Chief Counsel Advice memoranda in 
which it described a withdrawal of a private letter ruling request by a 
taxpayer each year, on average.333 This amounts to 2.4 memoranda out of 
320 instances, on average, in which taxpayers withdrew their private letter 
ruling requests, or in 0.75% of the withdrawal cases.334 Put differently, in 
over 99% of the instances where taxpayers withdrew private letter ruling 
requests during the test period, the IRS did not publicly release a 
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memorandum describing the withdrawal.335 
As adverse private letter rulings are nearly always obscured from 
public view, dual tax transparency regarding this form of ex ante tax 
administration is absent. For instance, private letter rulings regarding tax-
free spin-offs almost exclusively provide taxpayers and their advisors with 
examples of transactions that the IRS views as complying with the 
provisions of Section 355 of the Code. It is highly unlikely that taxpayers 
will observe an instance of private letter rulings where the IRS rules that a 
transaction violates Section 355 of the Code, as the taxpayers that 
requested rulings in such cases likely withdrew them after learning of the 
IRS’s potential adverse ruling. Without dual tax transparency, taxpayers are 
unable to gain a complete understanding of the IRS’s legal interpretation of 
the tax law as expressed in private letter rulings. Further, Congress, acting 
on behalf of the public, cannot confirm whether the IRS, as its agent, has 
interpreted and applied the tax law consistently with its intent when issuing 
private letter rulings. Consequently, the lack of dual tax transparency 
regarding private letter rulings creates the potential for the development of 
“secret tax law,” the concern that initially motivated Congress to enact 
mandatory public inspection of written determinations.336 
For a contrasting approach, consider the IRS’s release of revenue 
rulings, which are the IRS’s official interpretations of the tax law. The IRS 
issues revenue rulings as “published guidance,” meaning that, unlike 
private letter rulings, all taxpayers can rely upon them.337 When the IRS 
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withdrawal of a ruling request or receipt of an adverse private letter ruling, the taxpayer may not 
disclose the ruling request submitted to the IRS or the reasons for the withdrawal or adverse ruling. 
Last, voluntary disclosure of withdrawals or adverse private letter ruling requests are unlikely to occur 
in the case of private corporations, business entities not subject to mandatory public disclosure rules, or 
individuals. 
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issues a revenue ruling, it usually includes a fact pattern that it concludes 
complies with the tax law and a fact pattern that it concludes does not 
comply with the tax law. For example, in Revenue Ruling 2007-42, the IRS 
issued guidance that addresses whether a corporation that owns a 
membership interest in a limited liability company is engaged in an “active 
trade or business” under Section 355 of the Code.338 In this ruling, the IRS 
provided a set of facts under “Situation 1” and a set of facts under 
“Situation 2.” It concluded that the hypothetical corporation in Situation 1 
was engaged in an active trade or business and that the hypothetical 
corporation in Situation 2 was not so engaged.339 While the IRS appears to 
appreciate the need to provide taxpayers with converse outcomes in 
revenue rulings, current law does not require the IRS to meet a dual tax 
transparency standard when publicly releasing private letter rulings. 
Alternatives. To achieve dual tax transparency, the law should be 
revised to require greater public disclosure from the IRS regarding private 
letter ruling requests from taxpayers. First, every private letter ruling 
request to the IRS from a taxpayer should be open to public inspection, not 
just those requests where the IRS issues a written determination.340 Second, 
while the IRS should continue to publicly release all private letter rulings 
where it makes a written determination, it should also be required to 
publicly disclose any instance in which a taxpayer withdraws a private 
letter ruling request prior to the issuance of a written determination. Third, 
the IRS should be required to disclose the timing of the taxpayer’s 
withdrawal of the private letter ruling request, specifically noting whether 
the withdrawal occurred following a conference with officials from the IRS 
Associate Chief Counsel’s office that reviewed the ruling request.341 Last, 
the IRS should also be required to include in the publicly accessible 
background file all communication, whether written or oral, with taxpayers 
regarding their private letter ruling requests, even if the taxpayers 
ultimately withdraw the request.342 In each case, if policymakers desire to 
protect privacy and proprietary interests, they can continue to require the 
IRS to delete all identifying information from publicly released documents. 
The probable objections to this alternative public disclosure policy for 
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 339. Id. 
 340. See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (2016). 
 341. See Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-1 I.R.B. 39. 
 342. See id. at 55. 
 
2017] THE TIMING OF TAX TRANSPARENCY 509 
private letter ruling requests are not persuasive. One objection is that this 
approach will not result in dual tax transparency because taxpayers may 
withdraw their ruling requests for reasons other than the knowledge that the 
IRS will issue an adverse ruling.343 The requirement that the IRS publicly 
disclose the timing of the withdrawal and the substance of any written or 
oral communications would provide the public with enough information to 
draw realistic conclusions about the IRS’s view of the taxpayer’s requested 
tax treatment. Another objection is that this approach would restrict the 
flexibility of the IRS in negotiating with taxpayers during private letter 
ruling discussions. A response is that the IRS already operates under 
similar disclosure rules, as all written communications regarding private 
letter rulings that it ultimately issues are open to public inspection as part of 
the background file.344 A credible justification for the exceptions for oral 
communications and communications in situations where the IRS will issue 
an adverse ruling is lacking. A final objection is that greater public 
disclosure will deter taxpayers from participating in the private letter ruling 
program. This concern, however, is unrealistic as a result of the high 
economic value of the private letter ruling compared to the costs,345 the 
conservative tax positions at issue in most private letter ruling requests, and 
the continuation of the deletion of identifying characteristics. 
2.  Tax-Exempt Determination Letters 
No form of ex ante tax administration has been the subject of as much 
attention or controversy in recent years as the IRS’s approval of 
organizations seeking tax-exempt status. In May 2013, the head of the IRS 
Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division commented at the annual 
meeting of the American Bar Association Tax Section that in reviewing 
applications by organizations to receive Section 501(c)(4) tax-exempt 
status as “social welfare” organizations, her division had especially 
scrutinized organizations with terms such as “Tea Party” or “Patriot” in 
their title (Section 501(c)(4) organizations are only permitted to engage in 
limited political activities).346 Days later, a report issued by TIGTA found 
that the IRS used “inappropriate criteria” based on political affiliation to 
screen Section 501(c)(4) applicants, delay processing of applications, and 
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submit “unnecessary information requests” to applicants.347 Critics accused 
the IRS of discriminating against organizations with conservative political 
ideology,348 while defenders of the IRS responded that the IRS also 
screened for terms in organization titles such as “Occupy” and “ACORN,” 
terms often associated with liberal organizations.349 The resulting firestorm 
caused multiple IRS officials to resign, led members of Congress to 
succeed in seeking cuts to the IRS budget, and “roiled the [IRS] for 
years.”350 
This controversy shows that where the IRS holds the power to deliver 
required approval for an organization to operate in tax-exempt form, a lack 
of public disclosure can create the perception that the IRS issues these 
approvals in an inconsistent, even discriminatory, manner. Surveys found 
that immediately following the 2013 Section 501(c)(4) controversy, less 
than a third of taxpayers reported that they trust the IRS to apply fair 
enforcement of the tax law.351 Due to the statutory requirements for various 
types of tax-exempt status,352 some applications lead the IRS to seek 
additional information, and others fail in securing IRS approval. When 
commenting on the incident, former President Barack Obama conceded 
that “you want to make sure everybody is being treated fairly.”353 Dual tax 
transparency, which is not required by the IRS’s current legal obligations, 
would assuage such public concerns regarding tax-exempt applications. 
Dual Tax Transparency. Current law requires public disclosure of 
instances where organizations have successfully obtained tax-exempt status 
from the IRS. When granting an organization’s request for tax-exempt 
status, the IRS issues to the organization a “determination letter.”354 If an 
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organization obtains a favorable tax-exempt determination letter, both the 
IRS and the organization must make the determination letter and the 
organization’s original application for exemption available for public 
inspection.355 The primary rationales underlying these rules are that these 
organizations benefit from public funding, donors may need to confirm that 
the organization has obtained certain tax-exempt status, and public 
disclosure may embolden the IRS’s efforts to ensure that these 
organizations pursue activities consistently with their applications for tax-
exempt status.356 For these reasons, when the documents are publicly 
disclosed, they bear the name of the tax-exempt organization.357 
In contrast, when the IRS issues an adverse determination letter, it 
publicly discloses its decision without revealing the organization’s 
identity.358 The IRS is required by statute to delete the names, addresses, 
and any other information that might identify the taxpayer prior to publicly 
disclosing the adverse determination letter.359 An applicant that fails to 
obtain tax-exempt status generally will have no reason to reveal its adverse 
determination letter publicly. For instance, an organization that seeks 
Section 501(c)(3) status, but that does not obtain a favorable determination 
letter from the IRS as a result of its failure to satisfy statutory requirements 
or for other reasons, may not seek tax-deductible contributions from 
donors.360 As publicly accessible adverse tax-exempt determination letters 
do not contain identifying information, the public has little-to-no ability to 
conclude that a specific adverse tax-exempt determination letter replies to a 
specific organization’s application. 
Current law prevents dual tax transparency by mandating publicity of 
the identities of organizations that obtain favorable tax-exempt 
determination letters, but not of the organizations that receive unfavorable 
determination letters.361 The 2013 Section 501(c)(4) controversy occurred 
precisely because an oversight institution, legislators, and many members 
of the public perceived that the IRS screened tax-exempt applicants based 
on political affiliation of the applicant.362 Without public disclosure of the 
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identity of the organizations seeking tax-exempt status, the public cannot 
observe whether the IRS systematically applies different treatment to 
applications for exemption depending on the organizations’ political, 
religious, educational, or other characteristics. An organization that has 
received an unfavorable determination letter or experienced a delay in 
receiving a determination letter may also unilaterally accuse the IRS of 
inappropriate discrimination in public. For instance, when Crossroads 
Grassroots Policy Strategies, an organization founded by Republican 
strategist Karl Rove, did not obtain a favorable determination letter from 
the IRS after several years since applying, it publicly charged that the IRS 
discriminates against Republican-affiliated organizations.363 Without dual 
tax transparency, however, the public could not verify the claims of 
organizations like Crossroads. 
Alternatives. Public confidence and trust in the IRS would be 
enhanced if the tax law required the IRS to publicly disclose the tax-
exempt applications and ultimate determination letters, whether favorable 
or unfavorable, of all organizations without deleting their names and 
identifying information. By identifying the recipients of both types of 
determination letters, this change would enable the public to determine 
whether the IRS discriminates against groups with certain political and 
other characteristic affiliations. To respond to the current ability of 
organizations to accuse the IRS of unduly delaying its tax-exempt 
applications,364 the IRS could be required to publicly disclose the filing of 
an application for tax-exempt status, including all identifying information, 
at the time the IRS receives the application. This feature would enable the 
public to determine whether certain types of organizations systematically 
experience greater delays than others in obtaining a determination letter. 
Each of these changes, which would require acts of Congress, would enable 
the IRS to defend itself against accusations of bias in its review of tax-
exempt applications. 
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These proposed changes present limited threats to taxpayers’ privacy 
interests. Organizations that apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status under 
current law assume that, if the IRS issues a favorable determination letter, 
both their application and determination letter will be publicly 
accessible.365 The IRS issues a warning to taxpayers regarding public 
disclosure before they submit their applications, and this warning could be 
adjusted to explicitly address the possibility of public disclosure of 
identifying information in the event of an adverse ruling.366 It is, thus, 
difficult to argue that the potential for public disclosure of an adverse 
determination would threaten an applicant’s privacy interests or discourage 
them from applying for tax-exempt status. 
In response to recent controversies, some have advocated for even 
greater public disclosure of taxpayer-specific information in the tax-exempt 
organization area. Some scholars, for instance, have argued that all tax-
exempt applications and determination letters and the results of all audits, 
closing agreements, and other written determinations involving tax-exempt 
organizations should be open to public inspection, without redaction of 
taxpayers’ identities.367 Even in the tax-exempt organization area, public 
disclosure of documents showing such ex post tax enforcement offers the 
potential for benchmarking and reverse engineering.368 For example, as 
tax-exempt organizations are currently legally required to publish their 
annual tax return, IRS Form 990,369 donors and watchdog organizations, 
such as the Better Business Bureau, regularly focus on “efficiency ratios” 
that can be calculated using information on certain lines of this form 
regarding the organizations’ expenses, including fundraising expenses.370 
Empirical investigations have shown that managers of tax-exempt 
organizations often engage in “opportunistic cost shifting” by over-
reporting expenses related to program services and under-reporting those 
related to fundraising expenses to avoid generating less attractive efficiency 
ratios than those of their peers.371 Public disclosure of the IRS’s closing 
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agreements with tax-exempt organizations could encourage influential 
donors to pressure managers to pursue more aggressive fundraising 
strategies, such as by participating in profit-generating ventures. And 
comprehensive public disclosure of the IRS’s audit practices would enable 
managers of tax-exempt organizations and third-party advisors, through 
reverse engineering, to determine whether particular tax positions or 
activities are likely to result in an IRS audit. By contrast, mandatory public 
disclosure of tax-exempt applications and determination letters can achieve 
dual tax transparency without presenting threats to the IRS’s ongoing 
responsibility to monitor and possibly audit these organizations. 
3.  Advance Pricing Agreements 
Advance Pricing Agreements are among the most economically 
valuable forms of ex ante tax administration. Transfer pricing is a method 
of allocating profits from a multinational corporation among the various 
jurisdictions where the corporation and its subsidiaries are engaged in 
business.372 Transfer pricing itself is not abusive. Yet transfer pricing 
arrangements create the potential for tax abuse because they involve 
transactions between related parties that may not feature market prices.373 
Abuse potential is especially pronounced in situations involving unique 
intellectual property that does not have an established market price.374 
When U.S. corporations shift significant amounts, or even all, of their 
profits to non-U.S. subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions, the IRS can re-
allocate income using the “arm’s-length standard,” where, ex post, it 
attempts to replicate the prices that would be paid had the transactions 
occurred between two unrelated corporations.375 In order to alleviate legal 
uncertainty for taxpayers and potential litigation for the IRS, the IRS has 
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allowed corporations to seek to enter an Advance Pricing Agreement.376 
Once executed, an Advance Pricing Agreement represents a binding 
written contract that ensures that for the period of the contract, which is 
typically three to five years, the IRS will not challenge the corporation’s 
transfer pricing structure under the arm’s length standard.377 
One characterization of Advance Pricing Agreements is that they 
effectively represent permission by the IRS for the largest U.S. 
multinational corporations, such as Google, Apple, and Amazon, to 
structure their global affairs in ways that will avoid billions of dollars of 
future potential tax liability.378 The corporations that enter into Advance 
Pricing Agreements are often publicly traded, meaning they are already 
subject to substantial financial public disclosure obligations by non-tax 
agencies.379 Despite these features, Advance Pricing Agreements are not 
observable by the public.380 
Dual Tax Transparency. When the IRS first instituted the Advance 
Pricing Agreement program in 1991, it treated the agreements and all 
background documents as “return information” protected by tax privacy.381 
Following several lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act,382 in 
January 1999, the IRS conceded that Advance Pricing Agreements were, in 
fact, “written determinations,” much like private letter rulings, and, 
consequently, would be subject to mandatory public disclosure.383 The IRS 
then informed all taxpayers who were awaiting Advance Pricing 
Agreements and those who had obtained them previously that it would 
soon publicly release all of the agreements in redacted form.384 Intense 
lobbying on behalf of U.S. multinational corporations ensued.385 Several 
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months later, Congress enacted a new statute that explicitly states that 
Advance Pricing Agreements and all background information related to the 
agreements are confidential tax return information.386 
No tax transparency, let alone dual tax transparency, regarding 
Advance Pricing Agreements exists under current law.387 Since the 
program was instituted, only one Advance Pricing Agreement, between the 
IRS and a predecessor of pharmaceutical corporation GlaxoSmithKline, has 
been made public (in that case, as a result of publicly observable 
litigation).388 More importantly, even if all Advance Pricing Agreements 
were subject to mandatory public disclosure, dual tax transparency would 
still not occur. If the IRS is not satisfied that a corporation’s proposed 
valuation of its assets is supported by economic analysis, it can exercise its 
discretion to refuse to enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement.389 In order 
to obtain dual tax transparency, the public would need access to all 
finalized Advance Pricing Agreements and requests for Advance Pricing 
Agreements where the IRS rejected the corporations’ proposed terms. 
The lack of public disclosure of Advance Pricing Agreements has 
generated suspicion that the IRS has facilitated U.S. and global tax 
avoidance by U.S. multinational corporations. In response to recent popular 
press news stories regarding the low effective U.S. tax rates of major U.S. 
corporations, some have branded Advance Pricing Agreements as 
“generous dealmaking,”390 where the “IRS loses revenue by cutting deals 
for substantially less than would result from a transfer pricing 
adjustment.”391 For example, in 2013, Lynnley Browning, an investigative 
journalist, reported that Oracle, a global computer technology corporation, 
reduced its U.S. tax bill by “nearly half” as a result of entering into several 
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Advance Pricing Agreements with the IRS.392 Browning relied on this 
example to portray the agreements as “the tax break that corporate America 
wants kept secret.”393 Despite the intimation of collusion between the IRS 
and taxpayers, the IRS is prohibited from addressing the accusations 
publicly as a result of general tax privacy rules.394 More importantly, the 
public also has no ability to review details of Oracle’s Advance Pricing 
Agreements, where the IRS ultimately accepted the taxpayer’s proposed 
terms, or to compare them to instances where the IRS declined to enter into 
Advance Pricing Agreements with other taxpayers.395 
Alternatives. To preserve the sociological legitimacy of the IRS and to 
enable all taxpayers to observe the IRS’s interpretations and policies in 
reviewing ex ante requests for legal assurance regarding proposed transfer 
pricing structures, the curtain of tax privacy on Advance Pricing 
Agreements should be lifted. Under current law and policies, to seek an 
Advance Pricing Agreement, a corporation must submit an application to 
the IRS, allow the IRS to perform extensive due diligence, allow the IRS to 
analyze the corporation’s proposed transfer pricing methodology, negotiate 
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the terms of the agreement with the IRS, and, finally, execute the 
agreement.396 Congress should revise the current tax privacy and public 
inspection statutes397 to mandate that the IRS publish both taxpayers’ 
requests for Advance Pricing Agreements and any final Advance Pricing 
Agreements between the IRS and taxpayers. Similar to the prior proposals 
regarding private letter rulings and tax-exempt determination letters,398 
mandatory public disclosure of both requests and outcomes in the Advance 
Pricing Agreement context would provide dual tax transparency. 
The most significant objection to this proposal is that public disclosure 
would expose sensitive proprietary information of U.S. multinational 
corporations to public eyes. A response is that, prior to public disclosure, 
an Advance Pricing Agreement or a request for an agreement could be 
redacted to remove all proprietary information, such as trade secrets and 
future business plans, as well as identifying information about the 
corporation that requested the agreement.399 Advance Pricing Agreements, 
thus, could be treated similarly to private letter rulings and other written 
determinations under current law.400 A counter to this argument is that 
Advance Pricing Agreements address a multinational corporation’s 
operations in their entirety and in tremendous detail, making redaction 
much more difficult than in the private letter ruling context, where the IRS 
issues guidance to one taxpayer regarding a discrete legal issue.401 
However, in 1999, when the IRS announced its decision to publish 
Advance Pricing Agreements, it embarked on the process of redacting all 
previously executed agreements, implying that publication with redaction is 
possible.402 Even in redacted form, such public disclosure would alleviate 
perceptions that the IRS makes “secret deals”403 when entering into 
Advance Pricing Agreements. 
Another potential concern is that public disclosure could interfere with 
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the IRS’s attempts to enforce the tax law regarding transfer pricing.404 At 
first glance, a publicly accessible Advance Pricing Agreement would 
provide a corporate manager with information about the transfer pricing 
structure of her peer corporations and would also provide insights into the 
IRS’s approach to transfer pricing issues. On the other hand, a corporation 
that seeks an Advance Pricing Agreement approaches the IRS affirmatively 
and voluntarily provides the IRS with extensive information in order to 
obtain the IRS’s ultimate approval. Because corporations voluntarily 
choose to seek Advance Pricing Agreements, and in doing so, agree to 
expose themselves to intense scrutiny by the IRS,405 these corporations are 
not likely to be engaged in abusive transfer pricing strategies. There is a 
low risk that by reviewing the Advance Pricing Agreement of a competitor, 
a conservative corporate tax manager would conclude that she needs to 
engage in more aggressive tax planning. In addition, Advance Pricing 
Agreements, if published, would not reveal the IRS’s detection and 
enforcement strategies. Rather, they would simply reveal the limits of the 
IRS’s bargaining positions in Advance Pricing Agreement negotiations. 
A final objection is that mandatory public disclosure could reduce 
corporations’ willingness to participate in the Advance Pricing Agreement 
program. Ultimately, the answer to this question could be obtained by 
tracking corporations that have already decided to pursue Advance Pricing 
Agreements and noting their responses after public disclosure is 
implemented. In the months following the IRS’s 1999 announcement that it 
would publish Advance Pricing Agreements in redacted form, the program 
did not experience a significant decrease in participation from 
corporations.406 One reason for this reaction is that corporate managers 
may assume it is possible that, at some point, their Advance Pricing 
Agreements and supporting materials could become open to public 
inspection in the same manner as private letter rulings. As this sample of 
taxpayer reactions shows, there is significant reason to doubt that 
corporations would abandon the Advance Pricing Agreement program.407 
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C.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND EX POST TAX ENFORCEMENT 
Although this Article has argued that the IRS should be required to 
publicly disclose instances of ex ante tax administration, it does not assert 
that the IRS should be free to enforce the tax law ex post without 
accountability to the public. Rather, policymakers should consider 
alternative approaches for enhancing the accountability of the IRS 
regarding its ex post tax enforcement actions that do not require public 
disclosure of tax return information. This Section concludes by briefly 
suggesting three such possibilities: changes to oversight, whistleblower and 
data access rules, and processes. 
1.  Oversight 
Increased congressional oversight should be explored as a potential 
mechanism for improving the accountability of the IRS to the public 
regarding its ex post enforcement actions. The IRS is currently required to 
report to the Joint Committee on Taxation any refund payment that exceeds 
a threshold amount ($2 million for individuals, $5 million for corporations) 
and to allow the Joint Committee thirty days to review the report prior to 
issuing the refund to the taxpayer.408 The Joint Committee on Taxation is a 
nonpartisan group of ten members of Congress, each of whom is a member 
of the tax writing committee of each house, with a full-time staff of tax 
experts.409 By statute, the IRS is only required to notify the Joint 
Committee and wait for the thirty-day period to expire.410 In practice, 
however, the IRS does not issue refunds until it resolves any objections that 
the Joint Committee staff raises.411 Congress enacted the refund reporting 
rule in 1928 in response to suspicions that the Treasury Department, 
headed by then-Secretary Andrew Mellon, had paid sizeable, unwarranted 
refunds to businesses related to Mellon’s oil ventures.412 The explicit 
motivation for the rule, therefore, was to increase the ability of Congress to 
hold the IRS accountable for refunds. 
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To further enhance the accountability of the IRS, the Joint Committee 
review requirement could be expanded to include settlements of certain tax 
deficiency disputes. Specifically, in addition to its current reporting 
obligation, the IRS could be required to deliver a report to the Joint 
Committee whenever it proposes to settle a tax deficiency dispute with a 
specific taxpayer where the final proposed tax deficiency reflects a 
reduction from the IRS’s initial asserted tax deficiency in excess of a 
threshold amount ($2 million for individuals, $5 million for corporations). 
For example, if the IRS initially proposes that a corporation owes an 
additional $100 million in tax liability for the 2013 tax year (as noted in a 
Revenue Agent Report)413 and ultimately agrees to settle the dispute for 
$92 million in tax liability, the IRS would be required to file a report with 
the Joint Committee on Taxation before finalizing the settlement (the $8 
million difference exceeds the $5 million reporting threshold for 
corporations). There is little economic difference between a refund of $2 
million and a reduction in tax deficiency of $2 million, making it difficult 
to justify different reporting requirements for settlements that result in a 
refund of taxes, on the one hand, and a reduction in the IRS’s initial 
deficiency assessment, on the other. Without requiring any public 
disclosure of tax return information, this proposal would enable Congress 
to exercise greater oversight by reviewing settlements where the IRS makes 
significant concessions to the taxpayer. 
Several likely objections to this proposed expansion should be 
considered. One potential concern is that the expansion of the Joint 
Committee’s role could politicize and delay the IRS’s ability to enter into 
settlements.414 The same concern exists under current law, even though the 
Joint Committee completes its review of the vast majority (over 75%) of 
proposed refunds within 30 days and rarely questions the IRS.415 If 
politicization is a concern, adjustments to both current law and the 
proposed expansion could emphasize that the Joint Committee’s role is one 
of review rather than approval. Another likely objection is that the IRS and 
taxpayers could respond by designing settlements that avoid the reporting 
requirement. Yet the same concern occurs today, where, for instance, a 
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taxpayer can avoid Joint Committee reporting by offsetting a refund (such 
as one due to a net operating loss)416 with a tax deficiency for the same 
year.417 A final objection is that the proposed expansion raises 
constitutional separation-of-powers concerns. Several commentators have 
raised this objection in response to the current reporting requirement 
regarding refund payments by arguing that current law empowers the Joint 
Committee (the legislative branch) to engage directly in a function of the 
IRS (the executive branch) by reviewing proposed refund payments.418 One 
response is that the current statute419 and the proposed expansion could be 
adjusted to explicitly state that the IRS is not obligated to seek approval 
from the Joint Committee during the thirty-day review period. Another 
possibility is that the proposal could be adjusted to simply require the IRS 
to inform the Joint Committee of the settlements described above within 30 
days after they have been finalized, rather than while they are still pending. 
In any case, the constitutional objections and potential remedies should 
apply equally to current law regarding refunds and to the proposed 
expansion to tax deficiency settlements. 
2.  Whistleblowers 
An additional accountability measure could be to encourage 
employees of the IRS to file whistleblower reports not just with internal 
review bodies, but with external review bodies as well. The IRS repeatedly 
instructs its employees to report malfeasance by IRS managers and other 
employees to TIGTA.420 Several commentators have suggested that fear of 
retaliation has dissuaded some IRS employees from filing whistleblower 
claims with TIGTA.421 Under current law, if an IRS employee commits a 
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“Section 1203” violation,422 otherwise known as one of the “Ten Deadly 
Sins,”423 such as willfully failing to file his own tax return correctly and on 
time, the employee can be terminated. As one IRS employee has 
commented when addressing this possibility, “It’s real easy to make a small 
mistake on a return, even for someone who knows taxes. So that gives [IRS 
managers] a real instrument of terror, so to speak.”424 Whether or not this 
specific allegation is supported and can be generalized, the comment 
highlights the possibility that some IRS employees refrain from reporting 
abuse to an internal review body, such as TIGTA. 
To enhance its ability to monitor potential abuses, Congress could 
revise current law to encourage IRS whistleblowers to file reports with 
certain external review bodies in Congress. In 1998, Congress enacted an 
amendment to the tax privacy statute that provides that any person with 
access to confidential tax return information, such as an IRS employee, 
who believes that the information relates to “misconduct, 
maladministration or taxpayer abuse” may disclose this information to the 
House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, or the 
Joint Committee on Taxation.425 Yet IRS employees have received little 
notice of this provision in IRS official communications (the Internal 
Revenue Manual contains only one reference, compared to 47 references to 
Section 1203 violations and TIGTA reporting procedures).426 
Congress could strengthen this statute by enacting several 
adjustments. Congress could clarify the specific types of potential abuses 
that should be reported. Specific acts by IRS officials could include: 
unjustified deviations from established audit procedures (such as by 
entering into a closing agreement prematurely);427 consideration of 
inappropriate factors in reaching audit or settlement decisions (such as 
political affiliation or personal relationships with the taxpayer);428 and 
failure to follow clearly established law and procedures (such as imposition 
of certain tax penalties).429 Even though other legal protections may be 
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available to IRS employees,430 Congress could affirmatively clarify within 
this statute that IRS employees may not be subject to retaliation or 
punishment for providing information to the authorized congressional 
committees. Finally, Congress could explicitly direct the IRS to publicize 
this statute to its employees in numerous media. 
Elevation of the congressional whistleblowing process raises several 
potential concerns, such as that it could increase politicization of tax 
administration, threaten taxpayer confidentiality, and fail to result in review 
that is as comprehensive as that of TIGTA. Rather than politicization, 
however, greater emphasis on congressional whistleblowing could enhance 
the public’s perception that the IRS cannot engage in maladministration of 
the tax law without answering to the public’s representative, Congress. 
Further, the authorized congressional committees have the power to request 
tax return information from the IRS and hold hearings under current law.431 
Prevention of violations of taxpayer privacy should be addressed in both 
current law and any expansion of the congressional whistleblowing statute. 
Last, congressional whistleblowing should not supersede or replace the role 
of TIGTA. IRS whistleblowers could file reports with this office and with 
the authorized congressional committees simultaneously. Alternatively, in 
the event that a whistleblower files a complaint with an authorized 
congressional committee exclusively, that committee would retain the 
ability to request TIGTA to conduct further investigation of the alleged 
abuse. 
3.  Data 
Finally, increased public disclosure by the IRS of anonymous tax data 
and greater access to this data by academic researchers would advance tax 
transparency without requiring public disclosure of specific taxpayers’ tax 
return information. Every year, the IRS publishes data that shows audit 
rates for individuals and businesses within different income brackets and 
describes, in aggregate dollars, the amount of civil tax penalties assessed 
and abated for various types of tax offenses, among many other items.432 
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The IRS publishes only macro data without any information that could 
identify any taxpayer. The 2014 IRS Data Book states, for instance, that, in 
2014, the IRS audited 271,574 income tax returns for individuals with 
income under $200,000 and conducted 37,501 field audits and 234,073 
correspondence audits.433 Despite the publication of this information, 
critics and academic researchers report that it does not allow for 
sophisticated analysis given its macro form. As Emmanuel Saez,434 Raj 
Chetty,435 and others436 have written, access to micro data, involving 
detailed information often revealed on tax returns, “is critical for cutting-
edge empirical research.”437 
Without revealing enough detailed tax return information to enable 
analysts to reverse engineer the IRS’s audit and related enforcement 
strategies, the IRS could increase the specificity of its published aggregate 
tax enforcement statistics. Consider several examples from the 2014 IRS 
Data Book. While the IRS reports that it assessed $1,072,236,000 in 
“accuracy penalties,”438 it could distill this figure into the multiple tax 
penalties that the IRS concedes fall into this broad category, such as tax 
penalties for negligence, substantial understatement of income tax, 
substantial valuation misstatements, substantial overstatement of pension 
liabilities, and understatement of reportable transactions, among others.439 
The IRS also notes that it abated $417,858,000 of assessed accuracy tax 
penalties,440 but it explains that it abated them for numerous reasons 
including IRS error, reasonable cause, and “administrative and collection 
costs not warranting collection of penalty.”441 Instead, the IRS could 
describe the specific amounts of tax penalty abatement attributable to each 
of these reasons. As another example, the IRS reports that it collected 
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$1,905,254,000 in taxes attributable to delinquent tax returns.442 In more 
refined data reporting, it could disclose the extent to which this amount is 
attributable to delinquencies of different time periods, such as more than 
one year or more than five years. These are just a few of many examples of 
refinements to the IRS’s current anonymous data reporting practices that 
could enhance the IRS’s openness to policymakers and the public. 
Additionally, with increased funding, the IRS could improve access to 
anonymous micro tax data by academic researchers. The IRS currently 
allows a small number of academic researchers to analyze this information 
in anonymized form, and only on the premises of secure IRS facilities.443 
The IRS Statistics of Income Division annually selects several research 
proposals that require access to tax return data and allows IRS officials to 
work directly with academic researchers on these analyses.444 IRS officials 
and researchers alike report that the IRS simply lacks “sufficient resources 
and bandwidth to accommodate many simultaneous research projects.”445 
Congress could foster such sophisticated analysis by increasing funding for 
collaborative research projects between IRS officials and academic 
researchers. Another possibility for increasing such collaborations, 
suggested by Alan Kreuger and others,446 is that the home research 
institutions of the academic researchers seeking access to tax return 
information could bear a significant portion of the associated costs (similar 
to research arrangements involving the U.S. Census Bureau).447 
While increased public and academic access to anonymous tax return 
information presents genuine concerns, these concerns are not 
insurmountable. 
In response to taxpayer confidentiality concerns, the public disclosure 
of such data in aggregate form would prevent others from deciphering 
specific taxpayers’ identities. Also, if more academic researchers gain 
access to anonymized tax return data, they would be subject to the same 
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statutory tax privacy rules as IRS employees,448 and the IRS would retain 
the ability to review final research projects to ensure that taxpayer 
confidentiality is preserved. 
Another potential concern is that increased access to tax return 
information, even in anonymous form, would increase the risk that analysts 
may reverse engineer the IRS’s enforcement strategies, potentially 
weakening tax compliance. The tax enforcement dangers discussed 
previously in this Article449 would materialize if the IRS were to publicly 
disclose micro tax data, such as complete tax returns, the results of tax 
audits, and the filing of reportable transaction disclosures by taxpayers. If 
the IRS only increases the specificity of publicly disclosed aggregate data, 
such as the aggregate dollar amount of certain tax penalties assessed in a 
particular year, this information would not enable taxpayers and analysts to 
determine, using either statistical or qualitative methods, the reasons why 
the IRS applied these tax penalties in specific cases. The IRS could also use 
currently available legal mechanisms to review academic researchers’ final 
analysis involving micro tax data and could prevent public dissemination of 
any analysis that would reveal the IRS’s approach to selecting tax returns 
for audit or its other tax enforcement strategies.450 
Increased public disclosure of anonymous aggregate tax data and 
academic access to anonymous tax return data, thus, could further the 
public’s “understanding of the important functions of the IRS”451 without 
threatening the IRS’s tax enforcement efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of greater tax transparency frequently suggest sunlight in 
the form of public disclosure of tax return information as a means of 
enabling the public to review the actions of the IRS. By considering the 
timing of the actions of the IRS that mandatory public disclosure would 
expose, this Article has made three unique contributions to perennial 
debates regarding tax privacy and tax transparency. 
First, the Article has argued that ex ante tax administration actions 
present more compelling justifications for public disclosure than ex post 
tax enforcement actions. By retaining existing tax privacy rules for certain 
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tax return documentation, such as complete tax returns of individuals and 
corporations, policymakers would avoid several adverse tax enforcement 
and compliance effects. Yet by ensuring broad public access to the IRS’s 
advance tax rulings, advance tax agreements, and approvals regarding 
specific taxpayers, policymakers would enhance the accountability of the 
IRS to the public without interfering with the agency’s ability to deter and 
detect avoidance and abuse. 
Second, the Article has proposed that when requiring public disclosure 
of ex ante tax administration, policymakers should strive to achieve “dual 
tax transparency,” where the public has access to instances where the IRS 
grants and denies taxpayers’ requests for advance tax rulings or 
agreements, even without an official written determination. It has provided 
several examples of ex ante tax administration where current law impedes 
dual tax transparency—withdrawn private letter ruling requests, adverse 
tax-exempt determination letters, and Advance Pricing Agreements—and 
has suggested specific public disclosure reforms. 
Last, this Article has proposed legal mechanisms other than public 
disclosure that would enhance the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex 
post enforcement. Possibilities include increasing oversight of certain IRS 
settlements by Joint Committee on Taxation, encouraging IRS 
whistleblowers to file reports with authorized congressional committees, 
and expanding public and academic access to anonymous tax data. 
By considering significant distinctions between different types of 
actions of the IRS, this Article has argued that some actions should occur in 
sunlight while others should remain in the shade. This analysis should have 
important implications for legislators, scholars, and taxpayers who seek to 
empower the public to monitor whether the IRS is enforcing the tax law 
fairly, efficiently, and effectively. 
 
